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Abstract
Numerous studies have demonstrated the pervasiveness of inaccuracies in patients’
retrospective recall of their symptoms (e.g., Stone, Broderick, Shiffman, & Schwartz, 2004).
Assessment methods that rely heavily on retrospective recall may lead to faulty clinical
inferences should a patient’s recall be biased or inaccurate. Despite lingering concerns about the
accuracy of retrospective recall in a variety of clinical and nonclinical populations, investigators
have not studied individuals diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This is
troubling given findings from laboratory studies that OCD patients may have deficits in episodic
memory (Muller & Roberts, 2005). This study investigated memory accuracy in OCD patients
using an ecological momentary assessment (EMA) research methodology. By using handheld
computers to collect self-monitoring data in real time, EMA data served as a criterion against
which retrospective recall was tested for accuracy.
Thirty-five patients diagnosed with OCD used a handheld computer to rate presence of
OCD and related symptoms four times per day for a week. Patients estimated the frequency and
duration of their behavior during the EMA self-monitoring phase. Results indicated that contrary
to a priori hypotheses, OCD patients’ retrospective recall of their EMA recorded symptoms were
relatively accurate. Consistent with hypotheses and previous studies, reactivity to the EMA data
collection procedure was not observed. Finally, the results suggest that despite participants’
accuracy when recalling frequency and duration of symptoms, participants were inaccurate in
estimating symptom covariance with supplemental items that measured non-OCD functioning
(e.g., amount of sleep, current level of stress, etc.).
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AN ECOLOGICAL MOMENTARY ASSESSMENT OF RETROSPECTIVE MEMORY
ACCURACY IN PATIENTS WITH OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER
Introduction
Clinical assessment relies on a patient’s retrospective recall to estimate the severity,
frequency, and intensity of presenting problems and variables that moderate and mediate
problem expression. Although clinicians implicitly assume patients are reasonably accurate
when reporting behavioral dimensions of their problems, researchers have noted inaccuracies
in retrospective reports. Researchers have investigated the accuracy of individuals’
retrospective recall1 across numerous behaviors and disorders. For example, retrospective
estimates of pain intensity (Stone et al., 2004), frequency of eating behaviors (Stein & Corte,
2003), coping behaviors (Stone et al., 1998), panic attacks (de Beurs, Lange, & Van Dyck,
1992), smoking lapses (Shiffman et al., 1997), and anxious cognitions (Marks & Hemsley,
1999), are systematically biased when compared to data obtained in vivo. As can be seen in
Table 1, studies that have investigated accuracy of retrospective recall vary with respect to
sample size, the duration of the targeted time frame, and behavioral dimensions assessed
(e.g., frequency, intensity, etc.). Nevertheless, all of these studies found at least some
evidence of inaccuracy in retrospective recall, though the direction (i.e., overestimation vs.
underestimation) of the inaccuracies differed across studies. However, early studies
investigating smoking frequency (Frederiksen, Epstein, & Kosevsky, 1975) and general
mood (Parkinson, Briner, Reynolds, & Totterdell, 1995) failed to find discrepancies in
patients’ retrospective estimates of their own behavior and data collected in vivo. Thus,
although not universal, retrospectively obtained data may be inaccurate (i.e., random error),
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biased (i.e., systematic error), or both (Shiffman et al., 1997). This study examined how
accurate patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) were when recalling their own
behavior.
Factors affecting accuracy of retrospective recall
One factor known to affect retrospective recall accuracy is the way in which the
person recounts prior events. When recalling instances of their own behavior, people either
estimate the frequency of a given behavior or enumerate individual instances of its
occurrence (Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996). Estimation strategies appear to be used
more often with frequently occurring behavior, for events further in the past, and as a result
of a question’s wording. Enumeration strategies are used with low frequency behaviors, for
events in the recent past, and when prompts explicitly instruct individuals to use enumeration
strategies (Menon & Yorkston, 2000). Furthermore, use of enumeration versus estimation
strategies is a function of the temporal regularity of the behavior. That is, memories of
temporally regular behaviors are consolidated and judgments are made by estimating mean
frequencies of past behavior. Although estimation strategies can lead to accurate recall, high
frequency behavior is difficult to estimate with any precision (Menon & Yorkston, 2000).
Therefore, it may be the case that recall of behaviors that occur with great frequency is less
accurate than recall of low frequency behaviors.
The level of current behavior has also been shown to influence accuracy in recall
estimates of past behavior. For example, in a study of 106 undergraduates, Conway and Ross
(1984) asked students to recall self-ratings of proficiency in several study skills they
provided prior to participating in a study skills improvement program. Students in the
improvement program recalled their previously evaluated study skills as significantly worse
1

A glossary of technical terms used in this study can be found in Appendix D.
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than students in the wait-list condition. In a recent review of errors in retrospective recall
estimates, Tourangeau (2000) concluded that retrospectively recalled pre-treatment skills
corresponded higher with current behavioral levels than with actual pre-treatment
functioning. In addition, it may be that accuracy of retrospective recall is state-dependent in
that negative affect potentiates recall of negative life events (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979).
Thus, the accuracy of retrospective recall may be a function of both the current level of
behavior and the person’s affect. As a result, patients may provide self-reports that
underestimate behavioral variability, imply greater trait-like properties than is actually the
case, and negatively influence the validity of a clinician’s inferences about covariation of
symptoms with changes in extrinsic variables (e.g., other behaviors, environments, contexts,
mood states, etc.).
Theories of autobiographical memory (i.e., memory for one’s own past thoughts and
behavior) attempt to explain the accuracy of retrospective recall while simultaneously
providing predictions about factors that mediate accurate recall. Brewer (1994) proposed that
autobiographical memory is partially reconstructed. That is, personal memories are
comprised both of aspects of the original experience and elements reconstructed from
intervening factors such as repetition of the behavior. Memory consolidation processes thus
impede accurate recall of events because information regarding certain key behavioral
dimensions are lost (e.g., frequency, duration, etc.). Furthermore, Brewer states that high
frequency events are cognitively organized by topographical similarity into self-schemas. A
self-schema is a unit of related information from which general abstractions are made. For
example, the self-schema for a person’s food preference would include information
concerning past experience with and impressions of different kinds of food. Information
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related to these experiences is stored in the self-schema and a statement about food
preference (e.g., “I like Italian food”) reflects an abstraction drawn from information in the
self-schema and not memories of individual episodes of behavior. Studies examining
behaviors that follow predictable if slightly varied patterns (i.e., script-like behaviors such as
birthdays, holidays, etc.) lend support to this position. For example, when asked to recall
attributes such as location, time, social context, and feelings of script-like behaviors, students
were more likely to utilize inferential retrieval processes than directly retrieving attributes of
events. Inferential retrieval processes refer to constructing memories as a result of effortful
processes whereas direct retrieval refers to memories generated immediately and
automatically (Herman, 1994). When prompted to recall specific episodes or periods of
stereotypical everyday experiences, or script-like behaviors (e.g., the previous week in
therapy), individuals exhibiting repetitive stereotypic behaviors such as obsessions and
compulsions may find the task difficult or impossible due to memory consolidation in selfschema formation. This may lead to the use of recall estimation strategies that yield
inaccurate and/or biased autobiographical data.
Accuracy of retrospective recall has been investigated primarily with regard to overt
behaviors (e.g., smoking, drinking, purging, etc.). The relative accuracy of retrospectively
obtained reports of latent processes (e.g., thoughts, emotions, moods, etc.) is less precisely
understood. This is troubling given that many theories of anxiety and mood disorders posit a
central role for cognition as a causal or maintaining factor (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985).
Marks and Hemsley (1999) examined reports of physical and cognitive symptoms in patients
with agoraphobia who completed an in vivo exposure task. Patients completed questionnaires
in fear-provoking situations (e.g., supermarket, restaurant, busy street) and within 24 hours of
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returning home. In vivo questions queried about the presence or absence of cognitive and
physiological symptoms since beginning the exposure. The questionnaire completed at home
included items querying about the presence or absence of symptoms in their feared situation
in general. Results from the recall task showed that participants significantly overestimated
the presence of some in vivo cognitions (e.g., belief that they were going to be sick, faint, and
choke to death) but not for any physical symptoms. Thus, recall bias was evident in
agoraphobic patients when retrospectively recalling frequency of anxiety-related cognitions.
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and Memory
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), a debilitating anxiety disorder, is defined by
repetitive, intrusive, undesired thoughts (obsessions) and/or repetitive, intentional behaviors
(compulsions) that function to neutralize anxiety or distress (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000; Karno, Golding, Sorenson, & Burnam, 1988). The behaviors must cause
marked distress, be present for at least one hour per day, or significantly interfere with
functioning.
Because accuracy of retrospective recall degrades as behavior increases in frequency
(Menon & Yorkston, 2000), the implications for assessment and treatment of OCD are
significant due to the high frequency of maladaptive cognitions and behavior in this
population. As a result, OCD patients may be more susceptible to inaccurate or biased
memory estimates of their symptoms than patients with other psychiatric disorders. For
instance, a diagnostic requirement of OCD stipulates that target behaviors occur at least one
hour per day. In contrast, the diagnostic criteria of Bulimia-Nervosa indicate that behaviors
must occur minimally twice per week (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Thus, all
other things being equal, OCD patients should demonstrate more memory inaccuracies than
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Bulimia-Nervosa patients as a result of the higher frequency behaviors. Although
correspondence between retrospective report and data obtained in vivo has been investigated
with lower frequency problem behaviors (e.g., agoraphobia, Marks & Hemsley, 1999; eating
disorders, Stein & Corte, 2003), high frequency behaviors such as those present in OCD
remain unexamined.
The accuracy of retrospective recall is also a function of the regularity with which a
behavior occurs (Menon & Yorkston, 2000). Menon (1994) suggested that behaviors that
occur with a fixed periodicity are stored in people’s memories such that when asked to recall
the frequency of these behaviors, individuals access the stored rate of behavior and apply it to
the time frame under examination. Menon also suggested that the greater the stereotypical
similarity in behavior over multiple occurrences, the greater the likelihood the behavior will
be represented in memory as an abstraction rather than as separate episodic memories. By
way of extension, OCD symptoms are presumably relatively similar across occurrences and
may be relatively regular in periodicity. Both of these attributes suggest that individuals with
OCD are more likely to use an estimation strategy than an enumeration strategy when
recalling OCD behaviors.
The accuracy of retrospective recall is also complicated by secondary memory
impairments that can occur in mood and anxiety-disordered patients. Attentional and
interpretive biases are well established with anxious individuals (Barlow, 2002). Assuming
that the accuracy of autobiographical memories is dependent initially on the quality of
encoding processes, retrospective recall in anxiety disorders may be a function of impaired
cognitive processing during both the storage and retrieval phases. In laboratory experiments
with OCD patients, deficits have been observed in memory retrieval (Savage et al., 1996) and
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implicit learning, or the ability to acquire knowledge through repetition but without
conscious effort (Deckersbach et al., 2002). These findings suggest the possibility of
structural brain abnormalities in patients with OCD. Specifically, corticostriatal system
abnormalities in the limbic system appear to be related to failings in implicit learning. Thus,
observed memory deficits may result from encoding difficulties.
Laboratory experiments suggest that relative to control subjects, OCD patients
exhibit deficits across various memory tasks. Laboratory examination of memory deficits in
patients diagnosed with OCD have concentrated on episodic memories, or personal events
dated in the past, and concentrated on verbal and nonverbal stimuli (Muller & Roberts,
2005). In their excellent review, Muller and Roberts concluded that whereas the evidence for
deficits in verbal memory is mixed, researchers have more consistently observed deficits in
non-verbal memory relative to control groups. It is important to note, however, that studies of
verbal and nonverbal memory utilize stimuli conducive for the laboratory (i.e., Wechsler
Memory Scale). Although laboratory stimuli are important, empirical studies are necessary to
test the generalizability and external validity of findings based on these stimuli.
One study has broadened the breadth of stimuli used in laboratory experiments to
include personal experiences (Wilhelm, McNally, Baer, & Florin, 1997). Through the use of
personally relevant stimuli, Wilhelm et al. found that memory biases in patients with OCD
also manifest themselves in the form of overgenerality effects, or the tendency to recall
categories of events when asked to recall specific instances. For example, when asked to tell
the “...first specific personal memory that comes to mind” (Wilhelm et al., 1997, pg. 24) in
response to a happy cue word, an overgeneral memory would be “when I watch movies” in
comparison to the more specific memory “the night we went to the new restaurant.”
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Compared to healthy controls, OCD patients recalled a significantly lower percentage of
specific memories and showed longer retrieval latencies during recall tasks. However, OCD
patients with comorbid depression recalled statistically significantly fewer specific memories
than OCD patients without depression. Wilhelm et al. concluded that depression and not
OCD per se may mediate the overgenerality effect. Thus, Wilhelm et al. is noteworthy for
two reasons. First, they expanded the range of stimuli used to study memory deficits in OCD
patients to include personally relevant events. Second, they observed that the relatively
inferior performance compared to control subjects may be specific to OCD patients or may
be confounded by the presence of a mood disorder.
Effects of memory bias on patient estimates of functional relations
Clinician inferences based on inaccurate patient recall have the potential to negatively
influence treatment planning and compromise treatment efficacy (Haynes, Leisen, & Blaine,
1997). Studies investigating the accuracy of autobiographical memories typically examine
frequency counts or dichotomous endorsements of events. Clinical practice, however,
normally requires patients to judge the covariance of symptoms, mood, and environmental
stimuli. Unfortunately, only one published study has systematically examined the accuracy of
symptom covaration estimates (O'Brien, 1995). In this study, advanced clinical psychology
graduate students were presented hypothetical self-monitoring data of a patient’s target
behaviors (e.g., headache frequencies, durations, and intensities) and hypothesized
controlling factors (e.g., stress level, number of arguments, sleep duration, and number of
pain killers taken). Students in this experiment overinflated estimations of weak relationships
and underinflated estimations of strong relationships (O’Brien).
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Given these findings, it is likely that patients also have difficulty identifying
functional relations. The term “functional relation” refers to whether two variables co-vary.
The term does not imply causality, although a causal relationship is one kind of functional
relation (Richard & Haynes, 2002). To date, no studies have examined how accurate
individuals with a mood or anxiety disorder are in estimating functional relations. One
would expect graduate students to be better at estimating the magnitude of co-varying
relationships than individuals with a diagnosed mental disorder. However, it remains an
untested empirical question if patients’ retrospective estimations of functional relations yield
the same inaccuracies noted in trained graduate students, if the inaccuracies are compounded
due to memory biases, or if personally relevant data (i.e., from one’s own life) mediate the
effect.
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA)
Laboratory studies examining memory biases utilize highly controlled experiments
with narrow ranges of stimuli (e.g., Stroop task, visual field manipulations, auditory
channels, lexical tasks, etc.). These stimuli and experiments have gone a long way toward
elucidating the vulnerabilities and phenomenology of patients with anxiety. Nevertheless, the
generalizability of such findings requires empirical validation. Studies designed to examine
the ecological validity of results discovered in laboratory studies will help specify the
robustness of currently understood phenomena and illuminate practical implications.
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) is a form of self-monitoring in which
behaviors are recorded by individuals in their natural environment (Stone & Shiffman, 1994).
In EMA studies, recordings are often made using a personal digital assistant, or PDA, that
prompts the individual at regular intervals for a response. In a typical EMA study, patients
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estimate the frequency of a behavior within a given time frame and record the estimate using
the PDA. Recording may occur following a machine-generated beep (signal-contingent
recording) or be self-initiated following the occurrence of the behavior (event-contingent
recording). In either case, EMA studies minimize latencies between the occurrence and
recording of behavior. In so doing, EMA represents a unique, ecologically valid opportunity
to assess the accuracy of retrospective reports. Individuals therefore generate an
incontrovertible index, or criterion, against which recall accuracy may be assessed.
Only one study has used EMA to examine OCD. Herman and Koran (1998)
compared EMA data with clinician-rated symptom severity obtained prior to EMA data
collection. Clinicians overestimated patients’ frequency and intensity of OCD symptoms
based on a Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (see description below) interview. The
discrepancy between clinician and EMA ratings was in the magnitude of d = .95 for
obsessions and d = .88 for compulsions. Unfortunately, the design did not address accuracy
of patients’ retrospective recall because participants did not engage in autobiographical recall
tasks. In contrast, the current study’s design allowed for direct comparison of an individual’s
autobiographical recall against a criterion record of behavior, thus providing an assessment
of retrospective recall accuracy in patients with OCD.
Reactivity of EMA
Despite potential advantages of EMA to increase accuracy of self-report,
interpretation of the data must attend to issues of reactivity. Reactivity refers to change in one
or more dimensions of behavior as a function of the method by which data are collected
(Barton, Blanchard, & Veazy, 1999). Numerous factors are thought to increase reactivity to
self-monitoring assessment methods. These include the valence of the target behavior
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(positively valenced behaviors increase reactivity and negatively valenced behaviors
decrease reactivity), motivation to change the behavior, visibility of the behavior (i.e., overt
vs. covert), frequency of recording, timing of the recording (i.e., immediately before the
behavior), and obtrusiveness of the monitoring device (Korotitsch & Nelson-Gray, 1999).
With respect to EMA, recent studies have not shown changes in frequency of behaviors or
motivation to change as a function of the monitoring method (Cruise, Broderick, Porter,
Kaell, & Stone, 1996; Hufford, Shields, Shiffman, Paty, & Balabanis, 2002; Stein & Corte,
2003).
Purpose
This study examined whether memory inaccuracy and/or bias were present in the
retrospective recall of OCD patients. Self-monitoring data collected via a handheld computer
was used as the criterion against which the accuracy of retrospective recall was assessed.
Detection of inaccurate autobiographical memories has important implications for clinical
judgment. Namely, OCD patients may be inaccurate in retrospectively reporting the
frequency and/or intensity of their symptoms. Given that case conceptualizations depend
upon the accuracy of patient self-report, identification and quantification of inaccurate recall
is important. Further, if large effect sizes exist between retrospectively recalled data and
EMA criterion data, then data collected using assessments that rely heavily on retrospective
recall should be interpreted cautiously. Finally, if recall bias is present, clinicians attempting
to understand functional relations of symptoms are faced with three options: relying on
biased data for clinical inferences, conducting time-consuming analogue assessments with
questionable external validity, or requiring patients to self-monitor their behavior during
treatment.
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: OCD patients’ retrospective recall of OCD symptoms will differ significantly
from EMA criterion data.
Current literature points to widespread memory biases in varied populations across
numerous behaviors. Although not universal, most recent and all EMA studies that compared
retrospective assessment to self-monitoring criterion data found evidence of inaccurate
retrospective recall. As can be seen in Table 1, effects were observed across studies with
various sample sizes, target behaviors, and lengths of recall periods. Depending upon the
study, participants’ retrospective recall was either overestimated or underestimated
dimensions of their own behavior when compared to criterion data. With regard to OCD,
experimental studies suggest that OCD patients may also have difficulty recalling dimensions
of their own behavior accurately. For instance, OCD patients provided overgeneral memories
when instructed to generate specific, personally relevant memories (Wilhelm et al., 1997)
and performed poorly in experimental tasks involving non-verbal stimuli (e.g., stimuli from
the Wechsler Memory Scales) relative to control groups (Muller & Roberts, 2005).
Therefore, we hypothesized that both the estimated mean frequencies and durations of
behavior provided by participants during a retrospective recall task would be statistically
significantly different from EMA criterion data.
Hypothesis 2: Ecological Momentary Assessment of OCD symptoms will not result in
statistically significant reactivity.
EMA studies have not detected reactive changes in behavior as a function of the
methodology (e.g., Hufford et al., 2002; Stein & Corte, 2003). In contrast, reactivity effects
have been reported in paper-and-pencil self-monitoring studies (Korotitsch & Nelson-Gray,
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1999). This study examined reactivity using repeated measurements (Times 1, 2, and 3) of
OCD (Y-BOCS and OCI-R) and depression (BDI-II) symptoms. Since this study used EMA
to monitor OCD but not depression symptoms, we hypothesized that reactivity effects
(should they occur) would be evident in changes in participants’ reports of OCD symptoms
subsequent to self-monitoring with a handheld computer. The same effect would not be seen
with participants’ depression symptoms. We hypothesized, however, that the EMA selfmonitoring would not lead to changes in participants’ reports of OCD symptoms.
Hypothesis 3: Participants’ estimations of symptom covariation magnitude will be
statistically significantly different from covariation statistics derived from EMA data.
The third hypothesis examined OCD patients’ ability to judge functional relations. A
similar task posed to trained graduate students showed poor estimation of symptom
covariation in a laboratory task (O'Brien, 1995). This study asked participants to estimate the
correlation between select OCD symptoms and supplemental, non-OCD variables. We
expected OCD patients’ mean estimated correlations to be statistically significantly different
from correlations calculated from EMA criterion data.
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Method
Overview
The study included 35 individuals diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder who
sought treatment at an anxiety disorders clinic. Participants were first contacted by phone
and asked a series of demographic questions (Time 1) and completed standardized
assessments. One week later, they met with research team members, completed additional
demographic questions, completed standardized assessments, and learned how to use the
handheld computers (Time 2). At the end of the following week, they returned the handheld
computers, completed standardized assessments, estimated frequencies and durations of their
behavior over the previous week, and completed an online measurement tool designed to
assess their ability to estimate functional relations (Time 3). Greater detail regarding
experimental procedure during each point of contact with participants is provided below.
Participants
Recruitment Strategies. Participants were recruited from the University of Michigan
Health System’s Anxiety Disorders Clinic in compliance with HIPPA regulations. Three
recruitment strategies were utilized. First, the research project was announced to all mental
health professionals in the Department of Psychiatry. Therapists were requested to describe
the study to their OCD patients and obtain permission for a researcher to contact patients
with further details. Second, OCD patients who expressed a willingness to participate in
research at the time of their therapeutic intake procedure were identified. Finally, flyers
announcing the study were posted in the University Hospital and on the electronic
blackboard for clinical research on the website of the University of Michigan Health System.

15
Sample. A total of 112 patients were identified as potential participants. Of these
patients, researchers were able to contact 75. Fifteen were eliminated because they did not
meet diagnostic screening requirements, 16 because they changed their mind about
participating in research, and one because of age restrictions. The remaining 43 patients were
enrolled in the study. Seven participants dropped out of the study after initial enrollment and
one participant did not complete the study due to failure of a handheld computer. Of the
seven participants who dropped out of the study, two participants indicated that they did not
wish to continue because they did not have enough time; the other five could not be
contacted to determine the reason for their attrition.
The final sample consisted of 35 treatment-seeking patients with OCD, 48.57% (n =
17) of whom were female and 51.43% (n = 18) male. The sample was mostly Caucasian (n =
29, 82.86%), with Asian (n = 4, 11.43 %), African-American (n = 1, 2.86%), and Hispanic (n
= 1, 2.86%) individuals also represented. The mean age of the sample was 36.31 years (SD =
12.21 years, Range = 20 to 62) with M = 15.88 years of education (SD = 2.46). Participants
were provided a $25 gift card to a local retailer in exchange for their participation.
Measures
Demographic Inventory. Appendix A includes a demographic questionnaire
developed for this study. The demographic questionnaire assessed standard demographics
and information relevant to inclusion and exclusion criteria. In order to reduce participant
fatigue, only items necessary for making inclusion and exclusion decisions were
administered at Time 1. The remainder of the items were administered at Time 2.
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). Appendix A
also includes the OCI-R. The OCI-R is the short form of the Obsessive-Compulsive
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Inventory (OCI) (Foa et al., 2002; Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998). The OCIR contains six subscales, each measuring a facet of OCD (i.e., washing, obsessing, hoarding,
ordering, checking, and neutralizing). Each subscale consists of three items, for a total of 18
items. Using a 5-point Likert-scale, each question queries how much the experience has
distressed or bothered you during the past month. Internal consistency for the OCI-R
subscales ranged from .82 to .90 with 215 OCD patients. Two-week test-retest reliability for
the subscales ranged from .74 to .91 (Foa et al., 2002). OCI-R scores were significantly
correlated with other measures of OCD, including the Y-BOCS (r = .53), the Global
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (r = .66), and the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (r
= .85). OCI-R scores are also significantly correlated with measures of depression, including
the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (r = .58) and the Beck Depression Inventory (r =
.70) (Foa et al., 2002). Although there is empirical support for convergent validity for the
OCI-R, discriminant validity relative to depression has yet to be demonstrated in an anxiety
population. Using a total cutoff score of 18, the OCI-R discriminated OCD patients from
anxious controls with 74.0% sensitivity and 75.2% specificity. To properly contextualize
questions for this study, the reference time-frame for questions was changed from the past
month to the past week. Further, the OCI-R was adapted to a PDA format with time intervals
shortened to the previous four hours (see Appendix B).
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989).
Appendix A includes the Y-BOCS, a clinician-administered semistructured interview
designed to measure severity of obsessions and compulsions over the past week. The YBOCS consists of 10 items, five each for obsessions and compulsions. The interview is
designed to follow the 64-item clinician-administered Y-BOCS checklist, which includes a
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list of current symptoms (over the previous 30 days). This list is then used to identify the
most prominent symptoms. Administration of the Y-BOCS takes approximately 30 minutes,
with subsequent administrations taking less time. One week test-retest reliability for the YBOCS was 0.90 (Kim, Dysken, & Kuskowski, 1990) and interrater reliability was r = 0.98
(Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, Mazure, Fleischmann et al., 1989). Internal consistency alpha
coefficients have ranged from 0.88 (Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, Mazure, Fleischmann et
al., 1989) to 0.69 (Woody, Steketee, & Chambless, 1995). The Y-BOCS has been shown to
correlate significantly with other measures of OCD. However, as with the OCI-R, the YBOCS correlates strongly with measures of general anxiety and depression (Goodman, Price,
Rasmussen, Mazure, Delgato et al., 1989).
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). [The BDI-II is not included
in an appendix because Harcourt Assessment, Inc., denied permission to publish in full or in
part.] The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire that measures the presence and
severity of depressive symptoms and suicidal ideation (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).
Administration takes approximately 5 minutes. One week test-retest reliability for the BDI-II
is 0.93 and internal consistency was 0.92 among outpatients (Beck et al.). The BDI-II
correlated highly with other measures of depression (Beck et al.) but, like most measures of
mood, had difficulty discriminating between depression and anxiety (Dozois & Dobson,
2002). Use of the BDI-II served two purposes. First, it provided an index of depression and
was used as a covariate to assess whether retrospective recall accuracy is a function of
depressive symptomatology (Wilhelm et al., 1997). Second, parallel assessment of depressive
and OCD symptomatology was used to estimate reactivity effects to the EMA data collection
method by providing a non-EMA data collection control.
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Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (Adult Version) (ADIS-IV). The
ADIS-IV is a semi-structured assessment interview for differential diagnosis of DSM-IV
anxiety disorders and other Axis I disorders. The ADIS-IV possesses good inter-rater
reliability, with kappa coefficients between .60 and .86 across disorders, except for
Dysthymic Disorder (kappa = .22) (Brown, DiNardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001). The
ADIS-IV was used to increase sample homogeneity by ensuring that participants were
accurately diagnosed with OCD during the screening procedure and to assess for comorbid
conditions. Subsections not relevant to the study were excluded, a procedure believed not to
compromise the psychometric integrity of the interview as a whole (Brown, DiNardo, &
Barlow, 1994). Therefore, the following subsections were excluded to reduce participant
fatigue: Dysthymic Disorder, Hypochondriasis, Somatization Disorder, Mixed AnxietyDepression, Medical History, and the Hamilton Scales for Depression and Anxiety.
Assessors
Assessors were advanced doctoral clinical psychology students and a clinical social
worker (MSW). Training for this project entailed several steps. First, all assessors watched a
training video of the clinician-administered interviews (Y-BOCS and ADIS-IV). Each video
contained several vignettes. Assessors were required to agree with at least 80% of the
experts’ (Initials J. H. and E. K.) diagnostic decisions and total scores on the Y-BOCS and
ADIS-IV. All discrepancies from the criterion were discussed, and the rationale for the
correct rating was provided by the principal investigator. Each assessor observed one YBOCS and ADIS-IV interview before administering supervised interviews. During these
observations, ratings between the principal investigator and the trainees were compared and
disagreements were discussed. If rating discrepancies between the principal investigator and
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the trainees exceeded 1 point on either the Y-BOCS total score or ADIS-IV diagnostic
severity scale, trainees were required to review the training videos.
Power Analysis
Estimates of predicted effect sizes regarding the magnitude of discrepancies between
retrospective memory estimates and EMA data were based upon previous studies of
reasonable similarity. Table 1 reports effect sizes of relevant studies. Overall, the mean
Cohen’s d for EMA studies similar to the current study was 0.60 (SD = .43, Range = -0.16 to
0.97). Because previous effect sizes have been variable, a projected Cohen’s d of 0.50
appeared justified. For dependent samples t-tests with an anticipated effect size of 0.50 and
alpha set to .05, 35 participants were required for statistical power of .82 (Borenstein,
Rothstein, & Cohen, 1997). In comparison, a study of similar design and purpose that
examined retrospective recall accuracy of eating-disordered behaviors reported a sample size
of sixteen participants (Stein & Corte, 2003).
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Inclusion criteria for the study were (a) age 18 to 65, (b) OCD diagnosis according to
the ADIS-IV, and (c) a score of 16 or higher on the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive
Scale (Y-BOCS) or greater than 18 on the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCIR). Exclusion criteria were (a) age under 18 or over 65, (b) co-morbidity with a disorder
known to be associated with impaired memory (i.e., current psychotic disorder, current
substance dependence, mental retardation, dementia, bi-polar disorder), (c) any physical
disabilities that prohibited participation (i.e., inability to view the computer screen, hear the
beep of a hand-held computer, or enter data into the computer), (d) inability to understand
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English, (e) suicidality, and (f) subclinical anxiety symptoms as determined by a Y-BOCS
score below 16 or an OCI-R score below 18.
Procedure
The study was conducted over a two-week period with three observation points. Time
1 observations occurred on the first day of participation. Time 2 observations occurred seven
days later, on the eighth day of the study. Time 3 observations occurred seven days after that,
on the 15th day of the study. Each point of contact with participants (i.e., Time 1, Time 2, and
Time 3) is described in more detail below. Figure 1 shows the design visually.
Screening Assessment (Time 1). Prospective participants were screened by telephone.
Patients were informed of their rights as a research participant and oral informed consent was
solicited prior to data collection. During the telephone screening, participants answered
demographic questions and were orally administered the OCI-R, Y-BOCS, and BDI-II.
Questions were modified when necessary to query for symptoms over the last week.
Participants meeting inclusion criteria were scheduled for EMA training at Time 2. Finally,
participants were instructed to informally monitor their symptoms during the ensuing week
with the statement: “Please pay attention to your symptoms over the next week.”
Time 2 (EMA Training). One week later participants met with a researcher and signed
the informed consent. Participants completed the OCI-R, Y-BOCS, and BDI-II a second
time. Instructions for the OCI-R were modified to query for symptoms occurring in the
previous week. In order to confirm participants’ OCD diagnosis and identify comorbid
conditions, participants also completed the ADIS-IV. An estimate of the accuracy of each
participant’s one-week memory was established by having participants recall their answers
from the OCI-R at Time 1. Thus, difference scores between Time 1 OCI-R scores and Time 2
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recall of those same scores served as an index of each participant’s ability to recall symptom
report information over a seven-day interval.
Participants then received a Palm Zire 21 hand-held computer and were instructed in
its use. The handheld computer had a monochrome, 5cm by 5cm screen. Data were recorded
by touching the screen using a stylus. Instruction included a demonstration of (a) how to
operate the hand-held computer, (b) how to initiate data recording, (c) how to correctly
record data, and (d) the beep that would signal them to record. Participants had the
opportunity to practice recording data and to ask questions, and were told the PDA would
time stamp their responses. Participants were also informed that every time they completed
an assessment within 15 minutes of being signaled, their name would be entered in a lottery
giveaway of a PDA at the end of the study. Participants were instructed to record any
technical difficulties or malfunctions in a notepad included with the PDA. A final
appointment was scheduled for seven days later. Participants were contacted on the evening
of the first day of EMA self-monitoring to address any questions regarding the use of the
PDA. Participants were told to call a researcher at any time if they had questions. The
research number was affixed inside the notepad attached to the hand-held computer. In
addition, participants were contacted on the third day to assess for any difficulties and again
on the sixth day to remind them of their appointment the following day.
EMA Self-Monitoring. During the week between Time 2 and Time 3 (days 8 to 14 of
the study) participants completed questionnaires on the PDA contingent upon an audible
signal tone every four hours (i.e., 10 a.m, 2 p.m, 6 p.m., and 10 p.m.) Each item read, “In the
last four hours…” and was worded in the past tense. Items delivered via EMA were adapted
from the OCI-R. Selected items were chosen because of their strong OCI-R factor loadings
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and because they represented six important facets of OCD (i.e., washing, obsessing,
hoarding, ordering, checking, and neutralizing) (Foa et al., 2002). Each item consisted of a
screening question followed by two follow-up questions if the screening item was endorsed.
First, the participant was asked whether he or she had engaged in a target behavior during the
previous four hours. If the participant did not endorse the item, the program algorithm
branched to the next OCD item. However, item endorsement caused the program to branch
to two follow-up questions that assessed the frequency and duration of the symptom. After
all 18 OCD items were assessed, the PDA administered seven supplemental items that
assessed length of sleep the previous night, present physical location, whether the participant
was alone, mood, stress level, anxiety, loneliness, and whether he or she experienced distress
following subjectively defined interpersonal conflict during the previous four hours. These
additional items were used for analyses involving the ability of participants to detect
functional relations and are hereafter referred to as supplemental items.
Sampling procedures available to EMA include (a) event contingent, or initiation of
recording based on the occurrence of a behavior; (b) fixed interval, or initiation of recording
following auditory prompts from the computer that occur on a predetermined regular time
interval (e.g., every 2 hours); and (c) random interval prompts, or initiation of recording
following auditory prompts from the computer that occur on a random interval schedule
(Shiffman, 2000; Stone & Shiffman, 1994). Interval sampling was used because eventcontingent sampling is best suited for discrete episodes of low frequency behaviors. The
diffuse nature of some obsessions would have rendered it impossible for participants to
determine when one obsessive episode ended and another began. Random interval sampling
was not used because retrospective recall intervals would not have been constant across
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participants, thus introducing a potential experimental confound. Combining different types
of sampling procedures (e.g., concurrent fixed and event-contingent sampling) was
conceivable; however, previous attempts with bulimia nervosa patients failed to generate
meaningful quantities of data from event-contingent entries (Wunderlich, December 9, 2004,
personal communication). Because a fixed interval sampling method provided both statistical
and practical advantages, the PDA prompted participants four times per day (10 a.m., 2 p.m.,
6 p.m., and 10 p.m.). Hourly prompting was rejected based on participant fatigue reported by
Herman and Koran (1998).
Time 3 (Retrospective Recall and Estimation of Functional Relations). On the last day
of the study, participants returned the PDA and completed the OCI-R, Y-BOCS, and BDI-II.
Using the prior week as the context, participants estimated the total frequency and average
duration of each OCD symptom queried by the PDA over the preceding week. For example,
participants were asked, (a) “In the last week (when you used the handheld computer), how
many times did you…” and (b) “On average, how long did you spend doing … each day?”
Retrospective estimates of daily behavioral frequencies and durations were then compared to
EMA aggregated data of mean daily behavioral frequencies and durations. The difference
between a participant’s retrospective estimate and the EMA collected data was the index of
recall accuracy.
After estimating the frequency and duration of all EMA-OCD items, participants then
completed a PowerPoint tutorial that explained the concept of correlation (see Appendix C).
The purpose of the tutorial was to teach participants the meaning of co-variation so that they
could estimate functional relations between selected OCD symptoms and other variables
(e.g., amount of sleep, mood, etc.). Embedded in the tutorial were concept quizzes on the
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topics of positive correlation, negative correlation, zero-order correlation, strong correlation,
and weak correlation. Participants were required to successfully answer these questions
before continuing. The participants then estimated correlations between select OCD
symptoms and supplemental EMA items encountered during the past week. Appendix C
includes the correlation tutorial and the scales used to assess participants’ accuracy in
estimating covariance of their symptoms with supplemental items. Participants estimated
correlations with the aid of a color-coded visual analogue scale ranging from -100 (perfect
negative correlation) to +100 (perfect positive correlation). We chose to express correlations
as a range from -100 to +100 in order to simplify the task for participants who might not
understand the meaning of decimal fractions.
The algorithm for selecting EMA-OCD items used in the correlation estimation task
was as follows. Given that the EMA-OCD was adapted from the OCI-R, participants’ OCI-R
scores assessed at Time 2 were used to select items for the correlation estimation task. In
order to broaden the range of behaviors in the estimation task, only one item from each
subscale was selected for each participant. Using data from Time 2, the three highest OCI-R
subscales were selected. Within each of these subscales, the one item endorsed at the highest
level was selected for the correlation estimation task. Occasionally, participants endorsed an
OCI-R item during the Time 2 assessment but did not endorse the corresponding EMA-OCD
at all during the following week. For such occurrences, up to three additional items (one for
each occurrence) endorsed during the Time 3 retrospective recall task were selected in an
effort to provide participants non-zero items for the correlation estimation task. Further,
assessors were given the latitude to assess additional high-frequency or high-duration items
revealed during the Time 3 retrospective recall task, if they were not captured by the OCI-R
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at Time 2. Thus, participants estimated correlations between the supplemental EMA items for
between 3 and 6 OCD behaviors.
Participants were then asked how confident they were in their memory, how accurate
they were in responding to PDA questions, and to estimate the accuracy of their covariation
judgments. Finally, they were asked about their awareness of the study’s hypotheses.
Participants were then debriefed and paid $25 in the form of a gift certificate to a local
retailer. In addition, participants who had consistently responded to PDA prompts in a timely
fashion had their names entered into a drawing for a new hand-held computer.
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Results
Participants’ Symptom Severity
During the screening interview at Time 1, participants completed the OCI-R, YBOCS, and BDI-II. Means scores for all participants included in the study (N = 43) were as
follows: OCI-R total score = 26.14 (SD = 9.67), Y-BOCS severity score = 22.44 (SD = 3.98),
and BDI-II total score = 22.67 (SD = 12.70). At Time 2, all participants completed the ADISIV to verify their Axis I diagnoses. As measured by the ADIS-IV, the mean OCD severity
level was 5.44 (SD = 0.81). The ADIS-IV uses a 0 to 8 scale with 4 considered the cutoff for
diagnostic presence. In addition to a principle or co-principle diagnosis of OCD, the mean
number of comorbid diagnoses in the sample was 1.31 (SD = 1.13). Social Phobia was the
most frequent comorbid diagnosis (n = 10), followed by Major Depression (n = 9), Panic/
Agoraphobia (n = 8), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (n = 4), Specific Phobia (n = 2),
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (n = 1), Dysthymia (n = 1), Body Dimorphic Disorder (n = 1),
and Trichotillimania (n = 1).
Data Screening
Missing data. The effect of missing data in an experiment of this type can
compromise inferences regarding the accuracy of retrospective recall in participants, given
that the EMA data form the criterion by which accuracy is assessed. Missing criterion data
can have the effect of degrading the quality of the criterion so that it is not a veridical
reflection of actual behavior. Thus, careful consideration of procedures for handling missing
data is required. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was examined first without employing statistical
corrections to account for missing data. It was decided that missing data corrections would
follow the first set of analyses if statistically significant differences were detected between
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EMA values and retrospective recall. In this way, the robustness of the findings would be
tested to determine if missing data accounted for any of the findings.
If a participant in this study completed the entire protocol, he or she would have
completed the EMA questionnaires 28 times over seven days. Unfortunately, the demands of
repeated measurement increase the likelihood that at least one (and perhaps more) EMA
observations will be missed. Generally, missing data can be categorized into three
theoretically derived but untestable statistical relationships: missing completely at random
(MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and missing not at random (MNAR) (King & King,
2001; Schafer & Graham, 2002). Missing data are considered ignorable if they are MCAR or
MAR. In this data set, the theoretical argument for the existence of MCAR or MAR is likely.
In other words, the probability that an EMA observation is missing is unrelated to the value
of the EMA-OCD variables or to the supplemental EMA variables.
Furthermore, in a repeated measures design, data can be missing at the unit level
(e.g., a participant does not answer any questions), item level (e.g., a participant answers
some questions during a given observation, but not others), and wave level (e.g., a participant
fails to answer one or more observations, but continues in the experiment to answer
subsequent observations). In this study, item level omissions did not occur because the EMA
program did not allow participants to continue without answering all questions. Instead,
missing data occurred at the wave level and consisted of scheduled observations that
participants’ failed to record (e.g.., when a study completer missed a 10 a.m. assessment, but
completed a subsequent assessment). Although procedures to correct for wave level missing
data are less established than item level data (Schafer and Graham, 2002), a commonly
accepted practice is to estimate missing data based on qualitatively similar waves (e.g.,
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within participant) to account for missing waves. Random-effects regression accommodates
for missing data in this way and is recommended for studies with multiple measurements
nested within participants (King & King, 2001).
Evidence of data entry errors or outliers. Prior to analysis, these data were examined
through various SPSS programs for accuracy and outliers. First, impossible values (e.g.,
recording 700 minutes as the duration of a behavior in a 4 hour period) were identified.
Given the nature of recording on a handheld computer, inadvertent recording errors were also
possible. Therefore, inconsistencies within participants across the week were identified. In
this study, an outlier was defined as a data point that was at least ten times greater than the
mean value for the same item for any given participant over the course of the week. Such an
outlier could have occurred due to inadvertent replication of a number on the keypad. Three
participants recorded impossible values, one of whom utilized an idiosyncratic recording
strategy (i.e., recorded 9999999 for frequency and duration consistently across the week and
in her recall). The other two participants appeared to inadvertently record impossible values.
When previously recorded values clearly pointed to recording errors (i.e., 120 minutes
recorded consistently across the week followed by 1200 minutes), the impossible value was
changed to be consistent with the rest of that participant’s data. This occurred 4 times and
was confirmed by written comments provided by two participants in the notebook provided
with the handheld computer. The remaining four outliers were changed to zero to prevent the
artificial inflation of EMA values, thereby guarding against data cleaning procedures that
favor the experimental hypothesis.
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Response Rate
Overall, participants responded to 872 of a possible 969 EMA observations for an
overall response rate of 90.0%. Of these, 702 (80.5%) occurred within 15 minutes of the
audible signal tone (either before or after), 752 (86.2%) within 30 minutes, and 798 (91.5%)
within 60 minutes. The mean latency between signal and response was 21.14 minutes (SD =
54.89). The response rate for this study is compatible to reported response rates of previous
studies with a similar design (i.e., 94%, Stone et al., 2004).
Hypothesis 1: OCD patients’ retrospective recall of OCD symptoms will differ significantly
from EMA criterion data
At Time 3, participants were asked to recall the total frequency of behaviors
measured by the EMA-OCD items over the previous week. Two analytic strategies were used
to measure participants’ retrospective recall accuracy relative to the EMA criterion data. The
first data analysis strategy utilized paired-samples t-tests to test for statistically significant
differences between retrospective recall estimates at Time 3 and aggregated EMA data. The
second strategy, random-effects regression, supplemented the t-tests and took into account
the missing wave-level data. The random-effects regression analysis was conducted in order
to take full advantage of the repeated observations within individuals. Implications of these
different approaches are addressed in the discussion section.
Paired-samples t-tests
A series of paired-samples t-tests were conducted to evaluate participants’ ability to
accurately recall the frequency and duration for each of the 18 EMA-OCD recorded
behaviors the previous seven days. Given the idiosyncratic symptom profile of OCD, only a
subset of the 18 EMA-OCD items were relevant for each participant. Participants who
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neither endorsed an item during EMA monitoring nor during the Time 3 recall were excluded
prior to conducting the analyses for that item. Therefore the n for each item was contingent
upon the number of participants who endorsed the item during the previous week. As noted
above, one participant was excluded due to failure to conform to the study’s protocol.
Tables 2 and 3 display the means, standard deviations, and statistical comparisons for
each of the eighteen frequency and duration EMA-OCD items. Using a Bonferonni familywise correction, the traditional .05 level of significance was divided by the number of
analyses run (one for each of the 18 EMA-OCD items), thereby setting alpha for each
comparison at .002 and the experiment-wise alpha at .05. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, none
of the comparisons resulted in a statistically significant difference between the participant’s
estimate and the EMA-OCD criterion. However, Cohen’s paired samples d suggested that the
difference between the EMA criterion values and retrospective recall resulted in medium to
large effect sizes for some behaviors. With respect to frequency questions, all items with an
effect size ≤.3 were underestimates of the behavior when retrospectively recalled relative to
the EMA criterion values. With respect to duration questions, all items with an effect size ≥
.3 were overestimates of the behavior when retrospectively recalled relative to the EMA
criterion values. Taken together, these results suggest that when asked to recall
ideographically relevant OCD behaviors, participants were often relatively accurate when
compared to an EMA criterion value. When inaccurate, however, it appears as if participants
underestimated with respect to frequency, but overestimated with respect to duration.
Combined, this suggests that participants exaggerate their duration per behavior recall for
some behaviors. However, it is important to note that Cohen’s d is mathematically related to
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the paired samples t-test2. Thus, given the limitations of the t-test noted below, conclusions
based on effect sizes should be interpreted cautiously.
Given that none of the comparisons yielded significant differences, analyses were not
repeated with missing data because replacement of missing EMA waves would only reduce
differences between retrospective recall and the criterion values. However, as can be seen in
Tables 2 and 3, the non-significant findings occurred despite large mean differences.
Removal of participants from item-level analyses who did not endorse that behavior resulted
in reduced power and contributed to the non-significant findings. It is thus possible that the
nature of these data may be inappropriate for the paired-samples t-test. One reason is that
aggregating the repeated EMA observations reduced statistical power and increased the risk
of Type II error. Further, the denominator in the paired-samples t-test captured all sources of
error variance in a single term. This approach did not capitalize on the repeated measures
nature of the data, which allows error to be partialed into separate terms. The failure to do so
also leads to the increased risk of Type II error. In comparison, random-effects regression
utilizes the full nature of repeated observations nested within individuals. With such data,
random-effects regression reduces Type II error and provides more accurate inferential
conclusions (Hedeker, 2004; Rowland & Thornton, 2003).
Random-effects regression
Hypothesis 1 was also tested using random effects regression with a feasible
generalized least square (FGLS) estimator. FGLS accounts for autocorrelation, thus yielding
unbiased and efficient estimates of recall accuracy. Dummy variables were coded to allow
for statistical testing of the effect of the variable in question (e.g., retrospective recall vs.
EMA mean). The equation estimated for the measurement γof subject i on occasion t is:
2

Cohen’s d for paired samples = paired-samples t/ √N

32
γ
it

=

α

+

β1Xit

+

β2Si

+ Єit

where,
i
=
t
=
α
β1, 2, etc.
Xit
Si
and
Єit

1, 2, …, N subjects;
0, 1, …, T timepoints;
is the constant (overall population intercept);
is the coefficient for that variable;
is the dummy variable to be tested (e.g., EMA = 0, retrospective recall = 1)
is the value for subject variables (e.g., education, memory, etc.) for subject i;
is the independent error for subject i at time t.

Furthermore, the error term Єit can be broken down into ui (unexplained variance that varies
across participants but not over time) and eit (unexplained variance that varies across
participants and time). This procedure capitalizes on the richness of panel data, accounts for
unobserved variables that vary across individuals, and thereby decreases Type II error.
Finally, this procedure is one of the most efficient and accurate means of accounting for
missing data (King & King, 2001). For these analyses, participants’ EMA-OCD data were
summed per day for each participant with complete data. Linear interpolation was used to
account for missing data within individuals for participants who missed one or more EMA
observations.
Rationale for Predictor Variables. The first set of random-effects regression analyses
examined participants’ retrospective recall accuracy with respect to behavioral frequency
after accounting for several theoretically relevant variables. The flexibility to include
additional explanatory variables in the random-effects regression reduced unexplained
variation of the OCD symptoms, thereby yielding more precise estimates of the coefficient of
recall and decreasing the probability of a Type II error (Rowland & Thornton, 2003). The
following eight variables were included in the model because of the potential influence on
OCD symptoms: (a) the number of years participants reported OCD symptoms, (b) OCD
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severity as measured by the ADIS-IV at Time 2, (c) a proxy test for one-week memory, (d)
self-reported accuracy of their retrospective recall following the recall task, (e) prior
knowledge of Hypothesis 1, (f) depression severity as measured by the BDI-II, (g) sex, and
(h) age. The first variable was included in the model based on the assumption that symptom
stability would be positively correlated with the amount of time the participant had
experienced the symptom. OCD severity was included on the assumption that OCD severity
may influence OCD symptom variance. The memory proxy, calculated as the difference
between OCI-R values assessed at Time 1 and recall of those answers at Time 2, was
included based on the assumption that participants with worse scores may have had more
difficulty recording their symptoms via EMA. Both participants’ self-reported accuracy of
the retrospective recall task and knowledge of the experimental hypothesis are potentially
related to OCD symptoms and were therefore included in the model. Depression severity was
included in the model based on the results of a previous study in which apparent memory
deficits in OCD disappeared once the effect of depression was accounted for (Wilhem,
McNally, Baer, and Florin (1997). The variable sex and age were included as standard
demographic variables. Given that the primary goal of this analysis is to examine the
accuracy of participants’ retrospective recall accuracy, these variables will not be interpreted
individually. Instead, they serve as the context for providing precise estimates of the
coefficient of recall.
Behavioral Frequency. Coefficients for the dummy variable recall (EMA vs.
retrospective recall of behavioral frequency) are presented in Table 4 along with inferential
statistics for each EMA-OCD item’s model. The coefficient of recall indicates the estimated
difference in the average daily frequency between recalled and EMA data. In these models,
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the coefficient of recall represents the average change after accounting for the eight predictor
variables described above, partialing the error variance, and autocorrelation. The error
variance is partialed into two components: (a) unexplained variance that varies across
subjects but not over time (ui ) and (b) unexplained variance that varies across subjects and
time (eit ). As can be seen in Table 4, most of the coefficients are negative values, indicating
that compared to EMA calculated average daily frequency, participants’ retrospectively
recalled average daily frequencies were underestimated. Across the 18 EMA-OCD items, the
average difference between retrospectively recalled daily frequencies and EMA daily
frequencies was generally less than 10, suggesting relatively accurate estimation. However,
two items were statistically significant: item 2 (i.e., “I checked something I didn’t need to”)
and item 10 (i.e., “I repeated certain numbers”). Of these, only the coefficient of recall for
item 10 suggested meaningful differences. The coefficient of recall indicates that after
accounting for the predictor variables, participants retrospectively recalled 139.3 more
incidences per day of “repeating certain numbers” than what was recorded on the handheld
computer.
Behavioral Duration. The second set of random-effect regression analyses examined
participants’ retrospective recall accuracy with respect to average daily behavioral duration
of the OCD behaviors after accounting for the same variables identified above. Coefficients
for the dummy variable recall (EMA vs. retrospective recall of behavioral duration) are
presented in Table 5 along with inferential statistics for each EMA-OCD item’s regression
model. As can be seen in Table 5, only EMA-OCD items 4 and 10 resulted in a significant
coefficient of recall. With the exception of these two items, differences between
retrospectively recalled average daily duration and EMA values did not exceed 15 minutes.
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This suggests that after accounting for the predictor variables, participants are relatively
accurate when retrospectively recalling average daily behavioral durations. The two EMAOCD items with significant coefficients of recall indicated that participants’ retrospective
recall of average daily durations was overestimated by 36 minutes for repeatedly counting
objects (item 4), z (125) = 2.88, p < .004, and 28 minutes for repeating certain numbers (item
10) z (100) = 2.44, p < .05.
The implication of these results is that, on average, OCD patients appear to accurately
recall both the frequency and duration of most OCD symptoms. Although explanation of
symptom variation was not a primary goal of this analysis, Tables 4 and 5 provide
information about the overall predictability of OCD symptoms, given the assumptions of this
model. The models’ overall R2 for behavioral frequency suggests that at best (EMA-OCD
item 16), approximately 50% of the symptom variance is explained by the variables in these
models. However, most of the models R2 were below .37, suggesting that for most items,
approximately 63% of the variation in OCD symptoms remain unexplained. Similarly, R 2
values for the models of behavioral duration were all below .37.
Further, random effects regression yields information regarding possible sources of
unexplained variance. More specifically, Rho indicates the percentage of unexplained
variation in symptoms due to unobserved factors that differ across subjects (i.e., subject
specific factors), but are constant over time. By way of extension, variance not accounted for
by subject specific factors is due to unobserved factors that differ across subjects and time.
For both behavioral frequency and duration models, Rho statistics were relatively high for
items measuring obsessions (i.e., EMA-OCD items 6, 12, and 18). This suggests that relative
to other items, unexplained variance in items measuring obsessions are likely accounted for

36
by participant specific factors that do not vary across time. These results suggest avenues of
investigation regarding the prediction of symptoms for future studies.
Hypothesis 2: Ecological Momentary Assessment of OCD symptoms will not result in
statistically significant reactivity
In order to assess for the presence of reactivity, one-way within-subjects ANOVAs
were conducted across the three time points using total scores from the OCI-R, Y-BOCS, and
BDI-II as dependent variables. The mean and standard deviations for these measures are
presented in Table 6. With respect to the OCI-R total score, results indicated a significant
time effect, Wilks’
s Λ= .65, F(2,33) = 8.78, p<.001, multivariate η2 = .35. Follow-up
polynomial contrasts indicated a significant linear effect with the mean OCI-R total score
decreasing significantly from Time 1 to Time 2 but not from Time 2 to Time 3.
Given the significant time effect observed in the OCI-R total score, one-way withinsubjects ANOVAs were repeated for each of the OCI-R subscales. Significant time effects
were detected for four of the six subscales: Washing, Wilks’
s Λ= .77, F(2,33) = 4.93,
p<.013, multivariate η2 = .23; Obsessing, Wilks’
s Λ= .69, F(2,33) = 7.28, p<.002,
multivariate η2 = .31; Hoarding, Wilks’
s Λ= .63, F(2,33) = 9.89, p<.001, multivariate η2 =
.36; and Checking, Wilks’
s Λ= .79, F(2,33) = 4.45, p<.019, multivariate η2 = .21. Significant
time effects were not detected for the subscales Ordering, Wilks’
s Λ= .97, F(2,33) = 1.31,
p<.28, multivariate η2 = .07 or Neutralizing Wilks’
s Λ= .92, F(2,33) = 1.51, p<.24,
multivariate η2 = .08. Follow-up polynomial contrasts indicated significant linear effects for
each of the four statistically significant subscales. Pairwise comparisons revealed statistically
significant time effects between Time 1 and Time 3 for each of the subscales. Statistically
significant time effects were also detected between Time 1 and Time 2 for the Obsessing,

37
Hoarding, and Checking subscales, but not for the Washing subscale. In contrast, time effects
were not detected between Time 2 and Time 3 for any of the subscales. In conjunction with
an examination of the means shown in Table 6, these results suggest that the time effects
noted in the OCI-R total score and subscales are due to changes between Time 1 and Time 2
but not Time 2 and Time 3.
Reactivity of the Y-BOCS was also examined using a one-way within-subjects
ANOVA. In contrast to the OCI-R, significant time effects were not detected for Y-BOCS
total score, Wilks’
s Λ= .85, F(2,33) = 2.93, p<.067, multivariate η2 = .15. Given a priori
hypotheses and results from the OCI-R obsession subscale, the Y-BOCS Obsession and
Compulsion subscales were independently examined for reactivity. Results indicated a time
effect for the Obsession subscale, Wilks’
s Λ= .73, F(2,33) = 6.14, p<.005, multivariate η2 =
.27, but not the Compulsion subscale Wilks’
s Λ= .98, F(2,33) = .35, p<.705, multivariate η2
= .02. With respect to the Y-BOCS Obsession subscale, follow-up polynomial contrasts
indicated a significant linear effect with the mean OCI-R total score decreasing significantly
from Time 1 to Time 3 and from Time 2 to Time 3, but not from Time 1 to Time 2.
Finally, reactivity was examined in the BDI-II using a one-way within-subjects
ANOVA. Results revealed a significant time effect for the BDI-II total score, Wilks’
s Λ=
.61, F(2,33) = 10.50, p<.001, multivariate η2 = .39. Follow-up polynomial contrasts indicated
a significant linear effect with a significant decrease from Time 1 to Time 2 and from Time 1
to Time 3, but not from Time 2 to Time 3. Similar to the OCI-R, most of the change in scores
was observed during the first week.
Of the three possible comparisons between the three time points, only the comparison
between Time 1 and Time 3 was significant for each scale, with decreasing means across the
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study (see Table 7). Therefore, if a polynomial contrast between Time 1 and Time 2 was
significant, the contrast between Time 1 and Time 3 is automatically significant. Given this
fact and because the purpose of these analyses was to detect reactivity of informal selfmonitoring of week 1 (Time 1 to Time 2) in comparison to EMA monitoring of week 2
(Time 2 to Time 3), interpretation of change per week was more important than the sum total
of change across both weeks. Thus, comparing change during week 1 and week 2 suggested
that most change occurred during the first week of informal self-monitoring. In fact, only the
Y-BOCS Obsession Subscale showed a significant change during week 2.
Hypothesis 3: Participants’ estimations of symptom covariation magnitude will be
statistically different from covariation statistics derived from EMA data.
Discrepancies in Estimated and EMA Correlations for Aggregated OCD Behaviors.
To test the hypothesis that participants’ estimates of magnitude of symptom covariation were
significantly different from those found in the EMA data, participants estimated the
relationship of selected OCD items with the six supplementary variables. For example, a
participant might estimate the relationship between obsessive thinking with sleep duration,
mood, stress level, anxiety, loneliness, and distress following an interpersonal fight. After
these estimates were completed, the process was reiterated for a second OCD symptom with
the same supplemental variables. Thus, each participant provided a minimum of 18 covariation estimates (at least 3 OCD behaviors x 6 supplemental variables = 18 estimates).
The procedure section above describes the algorithm used to select the EMA-OCD items.
A series of paired-samples t- tests were conducted to evaluate whether retrospective
covariation estimates (hereafter referred to as estimated correlations) were statistically
different from correlations calculated from the EMA data (hereafter referred to as EMA
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correlations). Since it is unclear whether participants answered these questions based on
behavioral frequencies or behavioral durations, estimated correlations were compared to
EMA correlations separately for behavioral frequencies and behavioral duration. Using a
Bonferonni family-wise correction, the traditional .05 level of significance was divided by
the number of analyses run (one for each of the 6 supplemental items), thereby setting
statistical significance at .008 for any individual comparison. Means, standard deviations,
and test statistics of overall estimated and EMA correlations were collapsed across
individuals, behavior, and individual rank-order of behavioral frequency and duration and are
listed in Table 8.
For the following analysis, each participant contributed multiple responses, thus
potentially violating the assumption of independence of observations. Violation of this
assumption normally leads to an increase in Type I error. However, as will be seen below,
the presence of some statistically non-significant results lend credence to the validity of these
conclusions.
Results showed that participants’ estimated correlations frequently departed from
EMA correlations to a degree that could not be accounted for by chance or measurement
error alone. In general, participants consistently overestimated the degree of relationship
between OCD symptoms and variables measured by the supplemental items. Significant
overestimations were found for correlations between behavioral frequency and stress t(117) =
7.58, p < .001, d = .70; anxiety t(114) = 9.15, p < .001, d = .85; and loneliness t(101) = 3.57,
p < .001, d = .35. Significant overestimations were found for correlations between behavioral
duration and stress t(117) = 7.02, p < .001, d = .64; anxiety t(113) = 7.83, p < .001, d = .73;
loneliness t(101) = 4.04, p < .001, 40; and distress following subjectively defined
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interpersonal fights t(30) = 2.88, p < .007, d = .52. It is noteworthy that the absolute
magnitude of estimated symptom covariation was always greater than the EMA symptom
covariation. In other words, participants were more likely to significantly overestimate
symptom covariation than significantly underestimate symptom covariation. Interestingly,
results indicate that the highest EMA correlation between OCD symptom fluctuation and any
supplemental item was only 0.21 (for the relationship between OCD behavioral duration and
levels of stress and anxiety) and accounted for just 4% of symptom variance. Nevertheless,
participants estimated a mean correlation of 0.51 between OCD symptoms and levels of
stress and anxiety, thereby estimating that 26% of the variation in OCD symptoms could be
explained by contemporaneous levels of stress and anxiety.
Given these findings, subsequent analyses were conducted to determine if participantlevel rank ordering of behavioral frequency and duration or specific OCD behaviors also
resulted in significant differences between participants’ estimations of symptom covaration
magnitude and EMA magnitudes.
Discrepancies in Estimated and EMA Correlations for OCD Behaviors Grouped by
Rank Order. Previous research suggests that accuracy of co-variance estimation is a function
of how frequently a behavior occurs. Therefore, co-variance estimates for behaviors that
occur with high frequency may be more difficult to accurately estimate than behaviors
occurring less frequently (O'Brien, 1995). In order to examine this hypothesis, participants’
Time 3 estimates of behavioral frequency and duration were placed in rank order. Given
concerns about statistical conclusion validity for extremely small samples, statistical tests
were conducted only on behaviors ranked 1st to 4th . When participants reported identical
frequencies or durations for two or more behaviors, ties were assigned the same rank order.
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Given this ranking procedure and the procedural algorithm for selecting comparisons at Time
3, only two participants estimated the covariation of six OCD behaviors, while only five
participants estimated the covariation of five behaviors. Means, standard deviations, and test
statistics comparing estimated and EMA symptom covariation grouped according to rank
order are presented in Table 9 for behavioral frequencies and Table 10 for behavioral
durations.
As can be seen in Table 9, participants’ consistently overestimated covariation of the
four most frequently occurring OCD symptoms with levels of anxiety (Cohen’s d = .56 to
1.25 for anxiety) and stress (Cohen’s d = .60 to .90). As can be seen in Table 10, the pattern
was replicated with respect to behavioral duration for the supplemental items measuring
levels of anxiety (Cohen’s d = .41 to .94) and stress (Cohen’s d = .33 to .86 for stress).
In contrast, results for both behavioral frequencies and durations pointed to
participants’ ability to accurately estimate their symptom covariation of the four most
frequently occurring OCD symptoms with sleep duration (d = .10 – .25 for symptom
frequency; d = .05 – .33 for symptom duration). Less consistent are comparisons between
estimated and EMA correlations for loneliness and mood. Although statistically significant
differences between estimated and EMA correlations for loneliness emerged only with
respect to behavioral durations (i.e., longest duration, t (37) = 3.55, p <.001, d = .58 and
fourth longest duration, t (9) = 4.04, p < .001), moderate effect sizes were observed for both
behavioral frequencies (d = .10 – .50) and durations (d = .22 – .58 for stress). With respect to
the supplemental item measuring level of current mood, clear patterns across the rank orders
of behavioral frequencies and durations did not emerge. The largest discrepancy between
estimated and EMA correlations for the supplemental variable mood with behavioral
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frequencies was noted for the least frequent behavior t (10) = 3.13, p <.011, d = .94. It is
likely that this result was not statistically significant as a result of the low number of
observations and hence low statistical power.
Contrary to a priori hypotheses, the accuracy of estimates did not appear to be a
function of the frequency or duration of the behavior relative to other symptoms.
Nevertheless, post hoc exploratory analyses were conducted to further test this hypothesis.
Specifically, a series of one-way ANOVAs were run to test whether the difference between
participants’ correlation estimations and EMA correlations varied as a function of the
absolute value of participants’ behavioral frequency and duration. To accomplish this,
difference scores were calculated by subtracting the EMA correlations from the correlation
estimates. These differences were then ranked according to the absolute value of participants’
Time 3 recalled frequency and duration. Participants were then grouped into tertiles
representing low, medium, and high frequency and duration. Mean absolute total weekly
frequencies for each tertile were as follows: Low M = 1.83, Range 0 to 7; Medium M =
18.02, Range 7.5 to 30; and High M = 601.21, Range 35 to 15000. Mean absolute daily
duration in minutes for each tertile were as follows: Low M = 0.72, Range 0 to 2; Medium M
= 13.99, Range 2.5 to 30; and High M = 159.80, Range 45 to 720.
Given the exploratory nature of these analyses, the significance level was set at .05
despite multiple comparisons. For the absolute value of behavioral frequency, differences
between estimated and EMA correlations were statistically significant only for the
supplemental item sleep, F(2, 101) = 3.39, p = .04. Differences for all other supplemental
items tested (i.e., mood, stress, anxiety, and loneliness) yielded statistically non-significant F
values. Thus, a statistically significant difference existed between the Low, Medium, and
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High tertiles for the supplemental item sleep, but not for the other supplemental variables.
For the absolute value of daily behavioral duration, differences between estimated and EMA
correlations were statistically significant for sleep, F(2, 101) = 5.03, p = .008; mood F(2,
115) = 3.29, p = .04; and loneliness F(2, 99) = 4.09, p = .02. Differences for the supplemental
items stress and anxiety did not yield significant F values. Post hoc inspection of mean
differences revealed that all significant F values resulted because of differences between the
Low and High tertiles. Of these, three resulted because the magnitude of overestimation was
greater for the High tertile than the Low tertile. Only the ANOVA conducted on behavioral
duration of the supplemental item mood revealed the opposite pattern, in which
overestimates occurred more in the Low tertile than the High tertile. Equally important,
inspection of group means suggests that non-significant results occurred although there were
relatively high differences between the estimated and EMA correlations across Low,
Medium, and High groups. Thus, these results suggested that differences between estimated
and EMA correlations vary as a function of the absolute value of behavioral frequencies and
durations. Specifically, these differences were driven by differences between the Low and
High tertiles. Some differences were not statistically significant, however, because
participants were uniformly inaccurate in estimating correlations regardless of the frequency
or duration of the behaviors. Although interesting, these results must be interpreted with
caution because a single participant’s estimated and EMA correlations contributed to
multiple groups, thus violating the assumption of independence of observations. That said,
violation of this assumption normally leads to the increase of Type I error. Given the
statistically non-significant F values observed, however, this may not have occurred.
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Consistent with results from the overall comparisons, these results highlight the
exaggerated magnitude of participants’ estimated symptom covariation when compared to
EMA correlations. With one exception for both behavioral frequencies and durations, all
estimated correlations were greater in magnitude than EMA correlations. This suggests that
both overall and across the rank order of behavioral frequencies and durations, participants
estimated stronger relationships than EMA correlations would support. A paired-samples ttest was conducted to test this conclusion. Results indicated that for behavioral frequency, the
mean estimated correlation (M = .17, SD = .45) was statistically significantly greater than
mean EMA correlation (M = .10, SD = .30), t(585) = 3.58, p < .001. Likewise, results
indicated that the mean estimated correlation for duration (M = .17, SD = .46) was
significantly greater than the mean EMA correlation (M = .10, SD = .32), t(586) = 3.34, p <
.001.
Discrepancies in Estimated and EMA Correlations for OCD Behaviors Grouped by
Subscale. To examine whether statistically significant differences between participants’
estimations and EMA derived calculations occurred more prominently with one type of OCD
behavior versus another, data were collapsed across individuals and behavioral rank orders.
The means, standard deviations, and test statistics for estimated and EMA correlations
grouped according to OCI-R subscales are presented in Table 11 for behavioral frequencies
and Table 12 for behavioral durations. Subscale behaviors were examined instead of
individual items because the algorithm used to select behaviors for estimation at Time 3
favored the first occurrence of each endorsed behavior per subscale. Thus, inspection of
individual behaviors would have resulted in statistics based on one or two individuals for
some items.
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Similar to calculations based on the rank order of frequencies and durations,
comparisons between participants’ correlation estimates and EMA correlations consistently
resulted in statistically significant differences for the variables anxiety (d = .29 – 1.16 for
symptom frequency; d = .16 – 1.11 for symptom duration) and stress (d = .31 – .86 for
symptom frequency; d = .21– .84 for symptom duration) across OCI-R subscales. In each
comparison, participants overestimated the magnitude of the correlation when compared to
the EMA values. This suggests that when estimating covariation, participants attribute more
explanatory importance to the variables of stress and anxiety than actually exists.
With respect to the variables sleep, mood, and loneliness, consistent statistical
differences were not detected for either behavioral frequencies or durations. However,
inspection of effect sizes in Tables 11 and 12 found that moderate and large effect sizes
regularly emerged for these variables. Given that subjectively defined interpersonal fights
were infrequently encountered by participants, statistics for these variables should be
interpreted with caution.
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Discussion
The results of this study partially support the contention that patients diagnosed with
OCD are inaccurate reporters of their symptoms. Although inaccuracies with respect to
retrospective recall of EMA assessed criterion values were largely unsubstantiated, evidence
of recall bias was observed in participants’ ability to recall functional relations of their
symptoms. Results of this study also support the contention that EMA does not result in
significant reactivity.
Hypothesis 1: OCD patients’ retrospective recall of OCD symptoms will differ significantly
from EMA criterion data
Results from both paired-samples t-tests and random-effects regression analyses
failed to detect consistent, statistically significant differences between retrospectively
recalled OCD symptoms and EMA criterion data. These largely non-significant results were
consistent across analyses for behavioral frequency and duration. The consistency of these
results is striking given the use of these two different statistical procedures. Although Type II
error may have increased in the paired-samples t-tests as a function of the relatively small
sample size used for each EMA-OCD item and single error term, these arguments do not
apply to the random effects regression.
The practical significance of the observed differences between retrospectively
recalled OCD symptoms and EMA criterion data is less consistent across the two analytic
approaches. Results from effect size analyses based on the paired samples t-tests suggest that
when participants were inaccurate, they tended to underestimate the frequency of their
behaviors relative to the criterion value, but overestimate the duration. However, the effect
sizes are mathematically related to the paired samples t-test, and therefore susceptible to
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similar concerns regarding statistical conclusion validity. In contrast, the coefficient of recall
in the random-effects analyses provides information about the average difference between
retrospective recall and EMA criterion values after accounting for predictor variables
included in the model and partialing of unexplained variance. As a result, the coefficient of
recall represents a statistically unbiased estimator of population parameters. Results from
these analyses suggest that across the 18 EMA-OCD behaviors, participants’ inaccuracies
were of little practical importance. The regression models of average daily frequency suggest
that across the 18 OCD behaviors, differences between retrospectively recalled daily
frequencies and EMA calculated daily frequencies exceeded 15 occurrences per day only
once (i.e., “I repeated certain numbers”). Similarly, average daily inaccuracy in estimated
duration exceeded 15 minutes per day on only two variables (i.e., “I checked something I
didn’t need to” and “I repeated certain numbers”). Thus, on the whole, the magnitude of
differences between participants’ retrospective recall and EMA criterion data is unlikely to
lead to drastic inaccuracies in clinical case conceptualization.
These results stand in partial contrast to inaccuracies reported in previous studies of
retrospective recall accuracy using EMA designs (Stein & Corte, 2003; Stone et al., 2004).
Several factors may account for these differences. First, participants in this study recorded
and recalled more behaviors. Second, target behaviors in this study were recorded using a 0
to infinity scale for behavioral frequency and a 0 to 240-minute scale for behavioral duration.
In contrast, Stone et al. utilized a 100-point visual analogue scale to record participants’ pain
intensity. Third, this study examined the magnitude of differences using t-tests and random
effects regression, whereas Stein and Corte examined differences using the nonparametric
Wilcoxen Test. Finally, OCD patients may differ from eating disordered patients and pain
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patients in a way that makes them more accurate for this task. Future research is needed to
clarify which of these hypotheses is more plausible.
The results of this study also failed to support contentions in the OCD literature of
memory inaccuracies, at least as measured in this study. Laboratory research has
concentrated on episodic memory of experimental stimuli and found the most consistent
evidence of memory inaccuracies for non-verbal stimuli (Muller & Roberts, 2005). Given
that this was the first study to examine memory difficulties of OCD patients in an
ecologically valid manner, it is unclear whether verbal memory processes, non-verbal
memory processes, or both are involved in participants’ recalled symptoms. Whereas
participants provided answers to the questions in this study in a verbal format, it is
nevertheless possible that the actual memories are at least partially non-verbal. Regardless,
the present study calls into question the ecological validity of laboratory findings. Future
studies utilizing varied stimuli both in the laboratory and via EMA are needed to tease apart
these issues.
Hypothesis 2: Ecological Momentary Assessment of OCD symptoms will not result in
statistically significant reactivity
Results from the current study suggest that reactivity did not occur in response to the
EMA recording method. Instead, reactivity in this study was observed during the first week
between Time 1 and Time 2. These results add to the growing body of literature that has
failed to detect reactivity as a result of EMA (e.g., Cruise et al., 1996; Hufford et al., 2002;
Stein & Corte, 2003). The failure to detect reactivity during EMA is important for this study
because it eliminates one threat to internal validity, namely that differences noted during
recall tasks are confounded by reactivity during EMA.
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The current study also demonstrated the importance of including a baseline period
prior to the collection of EMA criterion values. Multiple factors likely caused the decline in
symptom scores observed from Time 1 to Time 2. Hypothesized factors include increased
awareness of actual symptoms, increased familiarity with questions asked during the
assessment, instructions to “pay attention to your symptoms,” and improvement in symptoms
secondary to enrolling in the study and speaking to an assessor. In this study, the sum of
these effects resulted in statistically observable reactivity from Time 1 to Time 2, whereas
the addition of EMA from Time 2 to Time 3 did not. Failure to include the baseline period
would have relegated the decline in symptoms to the focal week for collecting criterion
values, thus obfuscating inferences regarding retrospective recall and symptom change.
The statistically significant decreases in symptom severity observed between Time 1
and Time 2 occurred despite patients’ overall longstanding length of symptoms and
treatment. As indicated above, this suggests that some aspect of the current study’s design
triggered the reactivity during the first week. It is possible that the subtle instruction to “Pay
attention to your symptoms over the next week” triggered this response. Alternately,
assessments administered at Time 1 may have cued participants to think more closely about
these behaviors than they had prior to the Time 2 assessment. To the degree that this is true,
Time 2 assessments may represent more accurate assessments than when participants were
completely “naive” at Time 1. Regardless of the cause, the observed reactivity from Time 1
to Time 2 in the absence of programmed treatment changes suggests that traditional
assessment in outcome studies may be biased towards overinflating symptom change. Future
studies with a control group who do not receive informal instructions at Time 1 may help
clarify the cause of the drop in symptoms.
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Hypothesis 3: Participants’ estimations of symptom covariation magnitude will be
statistically different from covariation statistics derived from EMA data
This study was the first to examine patients’ ability to estimate the magnitude of
functional relations between their focal symptoms and supplemental variables. Results
suggest that participants consistently overestimated the magnitude of correlations between
OCD behaviors and supplemental items. These effects were most robust for the relationship
between OCD behaviors and the supplemental items stress and anxiety, though nearly all
participants’ estimated correlations were overestimates across behavioral frequencies,
durations, and OCD symptom subtype.
These results are consistent with O’Brien (1995), who found that advanced graduate
students’ estimates of covariation based upon hypothetical self-monitoring data were
inaccurate. Graduate students overestimated weak correlations and underestimated strong
correlations. This study extended O’Brien’s findings of the overestimation of weak
correlations. Whether OCD patients also underestimate strong correlations, like the graduate
students in O’Brien’s study, could not be tested because strong correlations calculated
between OCD symptoms and supplemental items were not observed.
The impact of overestimated correlations on clinical decision-making is currently
unknown. Overestimations of symptom covaration could have a negligible impact on
treatment conceptualization, or it could lead clinicians to concentrate on attempting to
modify relationships that are largely spurious. Future studies are needed to understand the
pervasiveness of the overestimation effect, its consequences, and the degree to which it can
be observed in other patient and non-patient populations.
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Although ascertaining magnitudes of EMA correlations was not a main aim of this
study, these data represent one of the only real-time data sets collected on OCD symptoms
and therefore provide important insights into the dynamics of OCD symptoms. Inspection of
these data suggest relatively low correlations between OCD symptoms and the supplemental
variables. The low magnitude of EMA correlations is interesting in its own right as it seems
to contradict theories that posit an increase in the duration or frequency of symptoms in the
presence of stress and anxiety. By way of extension, these findings suggest that variation in
OCD symptomatology is dependent either on variables not assessed in this study or that
multifactorial models are needed to predict symptom covariation.
General implications of findings
Overall, this study suggests that OCD patients accurately recall the frequency and
duration of their OCD symptoms following one week of EMA. Despite accuracy in
retrospective recall tasks, OCD patients overestimated their symptom covariation. OCD
patients displayed greater accuracy than other patient populations tested using a similar EMA
design (Stein & Corte, 2003; Stone et al., 2004), although estimates of symptom covariation
were largely inaccurate. The importance of this finding lies in the following question: If
patients who are queried four times per day for a week demonstrate the ability to accurately
recall symptoms and yet overestimate symptom covariation, how inaccurate are patients’
reports of symptom covariation when given to treatment providers?
If the overestimation effect is replicated in other patient samples, researchers will be
called upon to explain why it occurs. It is possible that the cognitive load required to
consciously attend to factors that covary with symptoms exceeds the capacity of humans.
Proponents of statistical decision-making would likely endorse such a position (e.g., Garb,
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1998). It is also possible that if patients were taught the concept of correlations prior to selfmonitoring and told they will be asked to report on their symptom covariation, they may be
able to produce more accurate covariation estimates. The fact remains, however, that this is
not and never will be part of standard clinical practice. Therefore, in therapeutic settings,
clinicians may base case conceptualizations on inaccurate data.
General limitations of study
The study was limited in several ways. First, although the sample size in this study
was larger than a similarly designed study that found statistically significant retrospective
recall differences (n = 35 vs. n = 16), it was still relatively small. A greater sample size may
have increased the chances of detecting statistically significant differences in the
retrospective recall task. However, if the magnitude of differences observed in this sample
replicate, differences between retrospective recall and EMA criterion data lack practical
significance regardless of the results of statistical tests. That said, because a number of OCD
symptoms were not endorsed by all participants, the actual sample sizes for t-tests differed
across symptoms and were lower than the total N of 35 participants. Only after data
collection commenced was it clear that the idiosyncratic nature of OCD would lead most
participants to endorse only a portion of the EMA-OCD questions and that non-endorsed
questions would nearly always lead to perfect, though theoretically less interesting,
retrospective recall.
In this study, each participant functioned as a control for him/herself. Nevertheless, a
second limitation of this study is the lack of a control group. Although we fully acknowledge
that a control group could have added to the strength of the study, a separate control group
would have been needed for each hypothesis. Furthermore, a control group would have been

53
very difficult to generate for this study. For instance, conclusions regarding hypotheses of
retrospective recall and correlation estimations would have been strengthened by inclusion of
non-OCD patients. However, such a control group would have necessitated alternate items
relevant to those participants or led to complete zero-order responses because the participants
do not suffer from OCD. Either situation would have compromised the validity of the control
condition. In contrast, a control group would have been possible with respect to the
examination of reactivity. However, given the base rate of OCD and resultant length of
participant recruitment, the control group did not seem justified.
Future directions
Results of this study suggest several directions for continued inquiry. Future studies
are needed to clarify why data from this study stands in contrast to results from previous
investigations of retrospective recall accuracy using similar designs (Stein & Corte, 2003;
Stone et al., 2004). Of primary concern is whether this study achieved divergent results as a
function of the questions asked, or if OCD patients retrospectively recall their symptoms
better than other patients. If results from the current study are robust, then future research is
also needed to further test the external validity of laboratory studies that have detected
inaccuracies in OCD patients on various measures of memory.
Given that this is the first study to examine patients’ ability to estimate symptom
covariation, little is understood about this phenomenon. Further studies are needed to
understand the implications of symptom overestimation and the factors that mediate
covariance estimation errors. Furthermore, the supplemental items utilized in the covariation
estimation tasks represent only a fraction of the multiple theoretical variables currently
hypothesized to maintain OCD symptomatology. Inclusion of such variables in future studies
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would test the generalizability of both the present findings and hypothesized theories
generated using cross-sectional data.
Relatively little is known about processes patients used to generate retrospective
recall of behavioral frequencies, durations, and symptom covariations. Future studies might
address this issue by identifying low and high frequency behaviors, then querying patients as
to whether they utilized estimation or enumeration strategies as a function of behavioral
frequency or duration. Informal observation during data collection for this study suggests the
use of estimation procedures for high frequency behaviors. For instance, thinking out loud
during the recall task, one participant stated, “I answered x times every time the PDA beeped.
It beeped four times per day. That makes x occurrences every day for seven days. That means
I must have done it y times.”
Analyses in this study also suggest that further research is needed to understand the
daily fluctuations of OCD symptomatology. As suggested previously, either different
variables or multifactoral models will likely be needed to better understand variations in
OCD symptomatology. The high response rate of participants in this study over a relatively
time-consuming protocol suggests OCD patients can adhere to an EMA protocol. In fact,
some patients said they did not want to give back the PDA’s because they felt it helped them
understand themselves better.
In addition to future studies that necessitate data collection, additional analyses on
these data may provide further insights into the dynamics of OCD patients’ retrospective
recall and symptom covariation estimates. For instance, analyses in this study concentrated
on attributes of central tendency. Given that some participants were more accurate than
others, it is possible that symptom variability predicts accuracy. Likewise, symptom

55
variability may also predict those participants who can more accurately estimate symptom
covaration.
Data collected during this study may also facilitate the psychometric investigations of
how EMA data correspond to other assessment modalities such as clinician ratings (i.e.,
ADIS-IV and Y-BOCS) and self-report questionnaires (i.e., OCI-R and BDI-II). For instance,
EMA frequency and duration data can be compared against the Likert response formats of
the OCI-R to determine what constitutes “often,” “seldom,” and so on for participants.
Studies of human judgment suggest that the subjective context in which a participant answers
questions can have profound effects on their ratings (Birnbaum, 1999). Thus, the three
assessment time points plus the week of EMA observation may provide clues as to the
subjective contexts participants experienced during the study.
In conclusion, it is presently unclear what consequences result from the effects
observed in this study. Although it remains an empirical question, it is possible that accuracy
is unimportant in therapy, where a therapist and patient construct “truth” together over time
(Back, 1994). However, ascertainment of accurate data is a prerequisite to make valid
inferences and scientific progress.
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Table 1.
Characteristics of studies designed to compare retrospective and in vivo assessments

Study
de Beurs
et al.,
1992

Topic
Frequency of
panic attacks

Sample
Agoraphobics

Frederiks
en et al.,
1975

Reliability of
different
selfmonitoring
schedules
(smoking
frequency)
Frequency of
cognitions
and
physiologica
l symptoms
during

Student
smokers

Agoraphobics

Marks et
al., 1999

Format
Paper-andpencil

Type of
Assessment/
Frequency of
Signals
N
Event
32
contingent

1 week

Paper-and
pencil

Multiple
schedules

15

24 hours

Paper-andpencil

Event
contingent –
during an
exposure
exercise

20

Length of
recording
12 weeks

Results
Twice as many
retrospectively reported
panic attacks at pretest
compared to self-monitoring
reports from following
week. Improvement of
correspondence between
data collection procedures
over the course of the study.
Only comparison of same
time frame (week 6) yielded
less discrepancy.
Continuous recording more
accurate relative to daily or
weekly recording. However,
all procedures resulted in at
least 85% agreement with
objective criteria

Cohen’s d
-0.16 (at
week 6 of the
study)

Retrospective recall of
cognitions grater than in
vivo data especially for
catastrophic thoughts about
physical symptoms.
However, no discrepancy

Relevant
data not
reported

Relevant
data not
reported
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Study

Topic
exposure

Sample

Length of
recording

Format

Type of
Assessment/
Frequency of
Signals

N

Parkinson
et al.,
1995

Positive &
Negative
Mood
assessed on a
20- point
visual analog
scale

Non-clinical
adults

2 weeks

Handheld
Computer

SignalContingent/
Every 2
hours

30

Shiffman
et al.,
1997

Episodes of
smoking
lapses and
temptations

Smokers

2 week
baseline
plus time
to lapse
(up to 25
days)/
retrospecti
ve recall
occurred
12 weeks
later

Handheld
computer

Event and
Signal
Contingent/
Events + 4-5
random
assessments

127

Results
between retrospective recall
and in vivo data of
physiological symptoms.
Daily retrospective reports
significantly higher than
momentary reports for
positive, but not negative
mood. Similarly, weekly
retrospective reports
significantly higher than
daily retrospective reports
for positive, but not negative
mood.
Recall of EMA-recorded
smoking lapses poor across
items measuring mood,
activity, episode triggers,
and abstinence violation
effects. Average kappas of
these domains ranged from
0.18 to 0.27.

Cohen’s d

SD not
reported for
group means

Relevant
data not
provided
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Study
Stein et.
al, 2003

Topic
Eating
disorder
behaviors

Sample
Women with
threshold or
subthreshold
anorexia and
bulimia
nervosa

Length of
recording
4 weeks

Format
Handheld
Computer

Type of
Assessment/
Frequency of
Signals
N
Event
16
Contingent
Sampling

Results
Cohen’s d
EMA-recorded binging,
+0.44
excessive exercise, and sum (binging),
of all eating disorder
+0.88
behaviors significantly
(excessive
lower than retrospective
exercise), &
recall. Not all estimates of
+0.51 (across
behaviors compared
all eating
between retrospective
disorder
assessment and EMA were
behaviors)
significantly different.
Stone et
Engagement Community
2 days
Handheld
Signal
100
Compared to EMA data, on Data not
al., 1998
in coping
sample with
Computer Contingent/
average 29% underreported reported
behaviors,
job or marital
on average
and 21% overreported
assessed
stress
every 40
coping on the retrospective
dichotomous
minutes
recall. Overall, 23%
ly
discrepancy between two
methods. Underreporting
more likely at retrospective
recall with cognitive coping,
overreporting more likely
with behavioral coping.
Stone et
Pain
Chronic pain
2 oneHandheld
Signal
68
Correspondence between
+ .93 (1st
al., 2004
intensity,
patients
week
Computer contingent
retrospective recall and in
week); +.97
assessed on a
reference
vivo data moderate to high
(2nd week).
100 pt visual
periods
for between-person analysis,
analogue
but low for with person
scale
analysis.
Note. Relative to the criterion data, negative effect sizes represent underestimates and positive effect sizes represent overestimates
of retrospective assessment.
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Table 2.
EMA and Retrospective Recall of Total Behavioral Frequencies Across One Week
Item
1. I saved or collected something I don’t need

n
21

2. I checked something I didn’t need to

23

3. I got upset if things were not arranged properly

21

4. I found myself repeatedly counting objects

16

5. I round myself not wanting to touch an object touched by someone else

18

6. I found it difficult to control my own thoughts

30

7. I collected things I don’t need

17

8. I repeatedly checked doors, windows, drawers, etc.

17

9. I got upset when someone changed the way I arranged things

19

10. I repeated certain numbers

13

11. I washed or cleaned myself because I felt contaminated

21

12. Unpleasant thoughts came into my mind against my will

27

13. I avoided throwing something away because I was afraid I might need it
later
14. I checked stove burners, water taps, and/or light switches after turning them
off
15. I arranged things in a particular order

19

16. I thought about good and bad numbers.

11

15
19

EMA
9.52
(17.08)
57.43
(102.75)
32.67
(52.83)
84.69
(163.15)
20.22
(32.24)
611.40
(2751.34)
6.59
(7.44)
26.59
(45.51)
9.16
(12.86)
136.69
(259.93)
26.43
(40.21)
620.85
(2591.86)
6.84
(10.03)
13.13
(17.63)
45.32
(56.46)
97.27

Recall
5.86
(7.53)
17.11
(15.19)
13.07
(20.85)
85.38
(247.76)
15.47
(28.18)
592.23
(2725.80)
10.26
(16.13)
28.32
(71.46)
6.18
(8.56)
1267.92
(4135.08)
27.69
(63.75)
628.19
(2874.62)
8.66
(11.48)
20.50
(45.90)
15.61
(18.00)
58.00

t
-1.15

p
.263

d
-.25

-1.87

.075

-.39

-2.36

.027

-.52

0.02

.988

.00

-1.67

.114

-.39

-0.67

.512

-.12

1.19

.253

.29

0.25

.809

.06

-1.83

.083

-.42

1.05

.315

.29

0.20

.843

.04

0.12

.905

.02

0.66

.517

.15

0.71

.488

.18

-2.56

.020

-.59

-1.14

.281

-.34
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17. I washed my hands longer than necessary

13

18. I had troubling thoughts that were difficult to get rid of

30

(139.42)
11.00
(15.29)
598.17
(2724.65)

(80.72)
6.58
(5.94)
606.75
(2729.01)

-1.05

.315

-.29

0.20

.844

.04

Note. Negative numbers represent underestimates of the retrospective recall relative to the EMA criterion value and positive
numbers overestimates.
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Table 3.
EMA and Retrospective Recall of Average Daily Duration in Minutes per Behavior Across One Week
Item
1. I saved or collected something I don’t need

n
21

2. I checked something I didn’t need to

23

3. I got upset if things were not arranged properly

21

4. I found myself repeatedly counting objects

16

5. I round myself not wanting to touch an object touched by someone else

18

6. I found it difficult to control my own thoughts

30

7. I collected things I don’t need

17

8. I repeatedly checked doors, windows, drawers, etc.

17

9. I got upset when someone changed the way I arranged things

19

10. I repeated certain numbers

13

11. I washed or cleaned myself because I felt contaminated

21

12. Unpleasant thoughts came into my mind against my will

27

13. I avoided throwing something away because I was afraid I might need it
later
14. I checked stove burners, water taps, and/or light switches after turning them
off
15. I arranged things in a particular order

19

16. I thought about good and bad numbers.

11

15
19

EMA
5.57
(10.17)
24.94
(40.34)
12.95
(16.02)
14.46
(23.95)
12.98
(26.12)
92.56
(148.55)
4.03
(5.97)
7.40
(10.61)
9.18
(16.93)
24.21
(30.35)
6.69
(6.95)
103.26
(163.70)
6.88
(15.57)
3.44
(4.54)
23.80
(28.48)
25.95

Recall
3.83
(6.96)
24.11
(35.47)
12.17
(14.89)
54.25
(124.88)
8.24
(14.84)
91.46
(151.97)
8.28
(14.74)
13.05
(15.90)
7.58
(13.82)
55.02
(79.30)
7.24
(9.89)
108.94
(163.74)
8.26
(15.18)
10.03
(11.90)
19.58
(30.13)
40.39

t
-0.71

p
.489

d
-.15

-0.14

.890

-.03

-0.26

.795

-.06

1.54

.145

.39

-1.18

.254

-.28

-0.06

.950

-.01

1.11

.283

.27

1.86

.081

.45

-0.91

.375

-.21

1.80

.096

.50

0.36

.721

.08

0.28

.781

.05

0.31

.759

.07

2.26

.041

.58

-0.87

.398

-.20

1.07

.310

.32

62

17. I washed my hands longer than necessary

13

18. I had troubling thoughts that were difficult to get rid of

30

(29.22)
4.80
(9.43)
99.00
(175.99)

(53.83)
4.50
(5.49)
95.11
(153.67)

-0.10

.926

-.03

-0.16

.875

-.03

Note. To equate metrics with the recall task (“On average, how long did you spend doing … each day?), EMA duration = weekly
duration total/ 7; Negative numbers represent underestimates of the retrospective recall relative to the EMA criterion value and
positive numbers overestimates.
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Table 4.
Summary of Random Effects Regression Analysis for Average Daily Behavioral Frequency
Item

df

1. I saved or collected something I don’t need

168

Recall
Coefficient
-.60

z

p

95% CI

Rho

-2.28 - 1.08

Overall
R2
.11

-0.70

0.484

2. I checked something I didn’t need to

186

-6.35

-2.65

0.008**

-11.06 - -1.65

.08

.66

3. I got upset if things were not arranged properly

169

-3.07

-1.33

0.184

-7.60 - 1.46

.10

.30

4. I found myself repeatedly counting objects

125

-1.96

-0.26

0.791

-16.50 - 12.58

.07

.46

5. I round myself not wanting to touch an object touched by someone else

143

-.81

-0.81

0.420

-2.77 - 1.15

.38

.39

6. I found it difficult to control my own thoughts

246

-12.14

-0.32

0.751

-87.04 - 62.75

.22

.78

7. I collected things I don’t need

134

.43

0.82

0.411

-.60 - 1.46

.12

.25

8. I repeatedly checked doors, windows, drawers, etc.

134

-.12

-0.12

0.908

-2.22 - 1.97

.34

.77

9. I got upset when someone changed the way I arranged things

151

-.54

-0.78

0.437

-1.91 - .82

.16

.11

10. I repeated certain numbers

100

139.30

2.89

0.004**

44.97 - 233.63

.24

.09

11. I washed or cleaned myself because I felt contaminated

169

-.41

-0.32

0.747

-2.94 - 2.11

.37

.47

12. Unpleasant thoughts came into my mind against my will

222

-3.67

-0.08

0.936

-93.42 - 86.09

.25

.66

13. I avoided throwing something away because I was afraid I might need
it later

151

.06

0.12

0.908

-.89 - 1.00

.22

.29

14. I checked stove burners, water taps, and/or light switches after turning
them off

117

.78

0.69

0.492

-1.44 - 3.00

.21

.21

15. I arranged things in a particular order

151

-4.74

-1.78

0.075

-9.95 - .47

.23

.09

.16
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16. I thought about good and bad numbers.

84

-7.09

-1.39

0.165

-17.09 - 2.91

.51

.55

17. I washed my hands longer than necessary

101

-.85

-0.54

0.591

-3.95 - 2.25

.09

.01

18. I had troubling thoughts that were difficult to get rid of

246

-8.32

-0.23

0.815

-77.93 - 61.29

.22

.80

Note. * = p < .05; ** = p < .008
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Table 5
Summary of Random Effects Regression Analysis for Average Daily Behavioral Duration
Item

df

1. I saved or collected something I don’t need

168

Recall
Coefficient
-1.65

z

p

95% CI

Rho

-12.87 - 9.56

Overall
R2
.06

-0.29

0.772

2. I checked something I didn’t need to

186

-2.29

-0.35

0.724

-14.97 - 10.40

.19

.66

3. I got upset if things were not arranged properly

169

-2.12

-0.34

0.735

-14.41 - 10.17

.21

.12

4. I found myself repeatedly counting objects

125

36.08

2.88

0.004**

11.51 - 60.65

.17

.46

5. I round myself not wanting to touch an object touched by someone
else

143

-5.94

-0.56

0.575

-26.70 - 14.82

.19

.19

6. I found it difficult to control my own thoughts

246

-9.95

-0.53

0.599

-47.00 - 27.10

.20

.69

7. I collected things I don’t need

134

4.42

1.22

0.223

-2.69 - 11.54

.09

.00

8. I repeatedly checked doors, windows, drawers, etc.

134

4.01

0.98

0.329

-4.04 - 12.07

.11

.49

9. I got upset when someone changed the way I arranged things

151

-1.80

-0.43

0.669

-10.07 - 6.46

.21

.43

10. I repeated certain numbers

100

28.596

2.44

0.015*

5.66 - 51.53

.21

.61

11. I washed or cleaned myself because I felt contaminated

169

-.50

-0.18

0.858

-6.02 - 5.02

.16

.23

12. Unpleasant thoughts came into my mind against my will

222

-2.30

-0.09

0.930

-53.51 - 48.91

.21

.59

13. I avoided throwing something away because I was afraid I might
need it later

151

-4.77

-0.19

0.849

-53.72 - 44.18

.08

.00

14. I checked stove burners, water taps, and/or light switches after
turning them off

117

5.52

1.61

0.107

-1.19 - 12.24

.12

.11

.00
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15. I arranged things in a particular order

151

-4.91

-0.62

0.535

-20.45 - 10.62

.38

.13

16. I thought about good and bad numbers.

84

12.66

1.08

0.280

-10.33 - 35.64

.37

.49

17. I washed my hands longer than necessary

101

-.80

-0.12

0.908

-14.38 - 12.77

.10

.00

18. I had troubling thoughts that were difficult to get rid of

246

-11.82

-0.34

0.731

-79.29 - 55.64

.11

.45

Note. * = p < .05; ** = p < .008
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Table 6.
Sample Mean and Standard Deviation of Measures at Times 1, 2, and 3
Measure
OCI-R Total
Washing
Obsessing
Hoarding
Ordering
Checking
Neutralizing

Y-BOCS Total
Obsession
Compulsion

BDI-II Total

Time 1
25.80
(9.38)
3.37
(3.57)
6.71
(3.56)
4.26
(3.94)
4.46
(3.39)
3.89
(3.18)
3.11
(3.45)

Time 2
21.04
(9.81)
2.69
(2.89)
5.57
(3.63)
2.83
(3.62)
4.27
(3.54)
2.91
(3.32)
2.77
(3.82)

Time 3
19.97
(11.10)
2.29
(2.59)
5.86
(3.85)
2.83
(3.16)
3.74
(3.78)
2.83
(3.11)
2.43
(3.93)

22.10
(3.93)
11.23
(2.22)
10.87
(2.38)

22.20
(5.01)
11.01
(3.02)
11.01
(2.47)

20.91
(4.57)
10.13
(2.62)
10.79
(2.60)

22.00
(13.61)

18.23
(13.92)

17.69
(13.86)
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Table 7.
Significance Level of Polynomial Contrasts
Measure
Time 1 and 3
Time 1 and 2
OCI-R
.001**
.001**
Washing
.004*
.057
Obsessing
.015*
.001**
Hoarding
.001*
.001**
Ordering
.163
.612
Checking
.008*
.012*
Neutralizing
.124
.310
Y-BOCS Total
Obsession
Compulsion

.082
.006*
.823

.871
.646
.640

Time 2 and 3
.260
.075
.422
1.000
.125
.791
.110
.024*
.017*
.437

BDI-II Total
.001**
.001**
.550
Note. * = Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** = Statistically significant at
the .005 level
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Table 8.
Overall Estimated and EMA Correlations between Frequency and Duration of OCD Behaviors with Supplemental Variables
Item
Behavioral Frequency
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

n

Estimated

EMA

t

p

d

104
118
118
115
102
29

-.14 (.31)
-.22 (.39)
.45 (.33)
.51 (.36)
.19 (.32)
.32 (.37)

-.08 (.23)
-.11 (.24)
.20 (.26)
.19 (.25)
.06 (.29)
.07 (.62)

-1.61
-2.68
7.58
9.15
3.57
1.82

.111
.009
.001*
.001*
.001*
.079

-.16
-.25
.70
.85
.35
.34

Behavioral Duration
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

104
118
118
114
102
31

-.14 (.31)
-.22 (.39)
.45 (.33)
.51 (.36)
.19 (.32)
.32 (.37)

-.06 (.26)
-.12 (.28)
.21 (.28)
.21 (.28)
.05 (.26)
-.06 (.65)

-1.91
-2.29
7.02
7.83
4.04
2.88

.059
.024
.001*
.001*
.001*
.007*

-.19
-.21
.64
.73
.40
.52

Note. n = number of valid comparisons in the sample. Ns differ across covaration estimates as a function of the number of
infrequent behaviors (i.e., participants did not frequently encounter interpersonal fights) and variables that were constant in the
EMA data. Constant variables, and therefore incalculable correlation coefficients, resulted due to or invariant responding for a
variable across the week (e.g., a participant slept the same number of hours each night); * = p < .008.
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Table 9.
Estimated and EMA Correlations between Frequency of OCD Behaviors with Supplemental Variables Grouped by Rank Order of
Frequency
Item

n

Estimated

EMA

t

p

d

Most Frequent Behaviors
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

43
47
47
46
40
13

-.16 (.37)
-.23 (.41)
.51 (.31)
.62 (.28)
.22 (.38)
.34 (.35)

-.05 (.26)
-.18 (.26)
.28 (.23)
.25 (.22)
.13 (.29)
.11 (.74)

-1.62
-.83
5.24
8.47
1.50
.96

.114
.410
.001*
.001*
.141
.356

-.25
-.12
.76
1.25
.24
.27

Second Most Frequent Behaviors
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

28
31
31
29
26
9

-.17 (.32)
-.25 (.43)
.50 (.39)
.49 (.43)
.26 (.33)
.24 (.45)

-.14 (.20)
-.15 (.22)
.23 (.28)
.24 (.25)
.06 (.35)
-.03 (.51)

-.53
-1.16
3.33
2.99
2.74
1.17

.600
.256
.002*
.006*
.011
.276

-.10
-.21
.60
.56
.54
.39

Third Most Frequent Behaviors
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

21
24
24
24
20
6

-.10 (.25)
-.11 (.38)
.38 (.32)
.47 (.38)
.15 (.23)
.43 (.35)

-.04 (.24)
-.00 (.22)
.08 (.26)
.06 (.24)
-.04 (.28)
.07 (.59)

-.77
-1.13
3.67
4.50
2.25
1.16

.450
.271
.001*
.001*
.037
.300

-.17
-.23
.74
.91
.50
.47

Fourth Most Frequent Behaviors
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

9
11
11
11
11
N/A

-.08 (.16)
-.35 (.26)
.34 (.25)
.30 (.28)
.04 (.12)

-.11 (.18)
-.01 (.21)
.09 (.21)
.08 (.26)
.02 (.20)

-1.91
-3.13
7.02
7.83
4.04

.706
.011
.011
.023
.758

.13
.94
.94
.81
.10
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Note. n = number of valid comparisons in the sample. Ns differ across covariation estimates as a function of the number of
infrequent behaviors (i.e., participants did not frequently encounter interpersonal fights) and variables that were constant in the
EMA data. Constant variables, and therefore incalculable correlation coefficients, resulted due to invariant responding for a
variable across the week (e.g., a participant slept the same number of hours each night); * = p < .008.
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Table 10.
Estimated and EMA Correlations between Duration of OCD Behaviors with Supplemental Variables Grouped by Rank Order of
Duration
Item

n

Estimated

EMA

t

P

D

Behaviors with Longest Duration
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

44
47
47
43
38
14

-.21 (.38)
-.22 (.47)
.55 (.35)
.67 (.32)
.33 (.39)
.49 (.40)

-.04 (.31)
-.22 (.32)
.29 (.30)
.32 (.29)
.10 (.27)
.00 (.71)

-2.20
.15
4.48
6.15
3.55
2.23

.033
.884
.001*
.001*
*
.001
.044

-.33
.02
.65
.94
.58
.60

Behaviors with Second Longest Duration
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

27
33
33
33
29
10

-.11 (.29)
-.26 (.30)
.42 (.31)
.41 (.34)
.10 (.28)
.30 (.24)

-.08 (.23)
-.10 (.24)
.18 (.26)
.19 (.24)
.04 (.25)
-.27 (.62)

-.58
-3.23
3.53
3.20
1.21
2.49

.567
.003*
.001*
.003*
.238
.034

-.11
-.56
.61
.56
.22
.79

Behaviors with Third Longest Duration
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

21
22
22
22
20
6

-.07 (.25)
-.14 (.41)
.45 (.29)
.49 (.35)
.15 (.21)
.05 (.43)

-.05 (.19)
-.05 (.25)
.11 (.31)
.07 (.28)
.01 (.30)
.07 (.61)

-.36
-.75
4.03
4.28
1.73
-.07

.724
.460
.001*
.001*
.101
.947

-.08
-.16
.86
.91
.39
-.03

Behaviors with Fourth Longest Duration
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

10
11
11
11
10
1

-.06 (.16)
-.25 (.31)
.26 (.35)
.28 (.35)
.04 (.13)
NA

-.07 (.24)
-.04 (.20)
.12 (.15)
.12 (.20)
-.02 (.25)

-1.91
-1.90
7.02
7.83
4.04

.059
.086
.001*
.001*
.001*

.05
-.57
.33
.41
.22
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Note. n = number of valid comparisons in the sample. Ns differ across covaration estimates as a function of the number of
infrequent behaviors (i.e., participants did not frequently encounter interpersonal fights) and variables that were constant in the
EMA data. Constant variables, and therefore incalculable correlation coefficients, resulted due to or invariant responding for a
variable across the week (e.g., a participant slept the same number of hours each night); * = p < .008.
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Table 11.
Estimated and EMA Correlations between Frequency of OCD Behaviors with Supplemental Variables Grouped by OCI-R
Subscale
Item

n

Estimated

EMA

t

p

D

Washing
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

10
13
13
13
11
NA

-.06 (.11)
-.22 (.22)
.30 (.29)
.36 (.37)
-.00 (.25)

-.01 (.12)
.03 (.19)
-.00 (.30)
-.02 (.28)
-.14 (.23)

-1.62
-3.13
2.81
3.58
1.79

.140
.009
.016
*
.004
.104

-.51
-.87
.78
.99
.54

Obsessing
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

36
39
39
39
33
11

-.26 (.40)
-.29 (.47)
.58 (.28)
.63 (.28)
.38 (.33)
.35 (.23)

-.09 (.22)
-.24 (.25)
.33 (.22)
.30 (.20)
.20 (.29)
.26 (.64)

-2.16
-.69
4.86
7.26
3.06
.47

.038
.494
.001*
.001*
.005*
.651

-.36
.11
.78
1.16
.53
.14

Hoarding
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

13
14
14
12
11
2

-.01 (.03)
-.02 (.32)
.24 (.33)
.30 (.34)
.10 (.20)
.20 (.71)

-.12 (.19)
-.03 (.20)
.03 (.16)
.08 (.16)
.22 (.18)
-.39 (.16)

2.21
.10
1.79
1.61
-1.81
-1.51

.047
.918
.097
.137
.100
.372

.61
.03
.48
.46
-.55
-1.07

Ordering
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness

15
17
17
17
15

-.16 (.34)
-.15 (.50)
.54 (.38)
.57 (.40)
.15 (.26)

-.12 (.21)
-.12 (.21)
.20 (.24)
.20 (.24)
-.02 (.28)

-.27
-.23
3.55
3.33
1.84

.786
.825
.003*
.004*
.087

-.07
-.05
.86
.81
.48
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Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

7

.45 (.33)

-.10 (.51)

2.09

.082

.79

Checking
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

19
22
22
22
20
5

-.05 (.30)
-.32 (.28)
.49 (.33)
.56 (.31)
.13 (.36)
.48 (.51)

-.09 (.30)
-.05 (.23)
.19 (.28)
.17 (.28)
-.08 (.29)
.11 (.80)

.50
-3.71
3.46
5.19
1.96
.782

.625
.001*
.002*
.001*
.065
.478

.11
-.79
.74
1.11
.44
.35

Neutralizing
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

11
13
13
12
12
4

-.12 (.15)
-.11 (.28)
.28 (.27)
.29 (.44)
.05 (.23)
-.35 (.51)

-.03 (.26)
-.04 (.24)
.21 (.18)
.16 (.18)
.08 (.15)
.54 (.27)

-1.93
-.84
1.13
.99
-.17
1.87

.082
.417
.283
.343
.867
.158

-.58
-.23
.31
.29
-.05
.93

Note. n = number of valid comparisons in the sample. Ns differ across covaration estimates as a function of the number of
infrequent behaviors (i.e., participants did not frequently encounter interpersonal fights) and variables that were constant in the
EMA data. Constant variables, and therefore incalculable correlation coefficients, resulted due to or invariant responding for a
variable across the week (e.g., a participant slept the same number of hours each night); * = p < .008.
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Table 12.
Estimated and EMA Correlations between Duration of OCD Behaviors with Supplemental Variables Grouped by OCI-R Subscale
Item
Washing
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

n

Estimated

EMA

t

p

d

10
13
13
13
11
0

-.06 (.11)
-.22 (.22)
.30 (.29)
.36 (.37)
-.01 (.25)
NA

.00 (.13)
.03 (.18)
-.01 (.27)
-.01 (.27)
-.11 (.18)

-1.31
-3.53
2.78
3.40
1.05

.223
.004
.017
.005*
.320

-.41
-.98
.77
.94
.32

Obsessing
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

36
39
39
38
33
12

-.26 (.40)
-.29 (.47)
.58 (.28)
.63 (.28)
.38 (.33)
.41 (.29)

-.07 (.32)
-.31 (.32)
.36 (.27)
.37 (.26)
.18 (.28)
.17 (.69)

-2.07
.18
3.72
4.69
3.20
1.01

.046
.862
.001*
.001*
.003*
.334

-.35
.03
.60
.76
.56
.29

Hoarding
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

13
14
14
12
11
2

.01 (.03)
-.02 (.32)
.24 (.33)
.30 (.34)
.10 (.20)
-.20 (.71)

-.11 (.23)
.00 (.21)
.03 (.16)
.07 (.14)
.13 (.17)
.38 (.17)

1.81
-.19
1.79
1.77
-.71
-1.53

.095
.849
.097
.104
.493
.370

.50
-.05
.48
.51
-.21
-1.08

Ordering
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

15
17
17
17
15
8

-.16 (.34)
-.15 (.50)
.54 (.38)
.57 (.40)
.15 (.26)
.40 (.35)

-.09 (.20)
-.08 (.25)
.17 (.31)
.20 (.27)
-.06 (.25)
-.18 (.63)

-.56
-.44
3.44
3.28
1.99
2.36

.587
.668
.003*
.005*
.066
.051

-.14
-.11
.83
.79
.51
.83
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Checking
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

19
22
22
22
20
5

-.05 (.30)
-.32 (.28)
.49 (.33)
.56 (.31)
.13 (.36)
.48 (.51)

-.06 (.27)
-.07 (.17)
.18 (.24)
.15 (.26)
-.03 (.23)
-.32 (.68)

.08
-3.71
3.95
5.21
1.94
2.16

.935
.001*
.001*
.001*
.067
.097

.02
-.79
.84
1.11
.43
.97

Neutralizing
Sleep
Mood
Stress
Anxiety
Loneliness
Distress following an Interpersonal Fight

11
13
13
12
12
4

-.12 (.15)
-.12 (.29)
.28 (.27)
.29 (.44)
.04 (.07)
.08 (.15)

.02 (.22)
-.02 (.29)
.22 (.19)
.21 (.16)
.02 (.26)
-.41 (.50)

-2.40
-.97
.76
.56
.30
2.36

.037
.351
.463
.585
.769
.100

-.72
-.27
.21
.16
.09
1.18

Note. n = number of valid comparisons in the sample. Ns differ across covaration estimates as a function of the number of
infrequent behaviors (i.e., participants did not frequently encounter interpersonal fights) and variables that were constant in the
EMA data. Constant variables, and therefore incalculable correlation coefficients, resulted due to or invariant responding for a
variable across the week (e.g., a participant slept the same number of hours each night); * = p < .008.
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Time 1
(Screening)

Time 2

1 week

1 week

NO EMA
(informal
monitoring
of
symptoms)

EMA
(monitor
symptoms
with
handheld
computer)

Measurements at
Time 1
1) Demographic
Inventory (Part 1)
2) Y-BOCS
3) OCI-R

Measurements at
Time 2
1) Demographic
Inventory (Part 2)
2) ADIS-IV
3) Y-BOCS

4) BDI-II

4) OCI-R
5) BDI-II
6) Recall of Time 1
OCI-R

Figure 1: Study Design

Time 3

Measurements at
Time 3
1) Y-BOCS
2) OCI-R
3) BDI-II
4) Recall of
EMA-OCD
5) Estimation of
Covariates
6) Exit
Questionnaire
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Appendix A
Measures
[Demographic Inventory]
[Obsessive-Compulsive Index – Revised]
[Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale]
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Demographic Inventory
Administered at Time 1 (Phone Screening)
1. Name
2. Gender
3. Contact Information
a. Preferred Telephone:
b. Email:
c. Address:
4. Year of Birth:
(If after 1987, do not continue)
5. Do you have any vision problems? Do you wear glasses? (determine ability to see
screen of hand-held)
6. Do you have any difficulty hearing? (determine ability to hear beep of hand-held)
7. Is English your native language?
a. If no, how well do you understand English?
i. Very well
ii. Well
iii. So-so
iv. Not very well
v. Barely understandable
Administered at Time 2 (1st Face-to-face interview)
8. Ethnicity
a. Asian
b. African-American
c. White/ Hispanic
d. White/ Non-Hispanic
e. Other (specify)
9. What is your highest Degree/ Years of education
10. When were first diagnosed with OCD?
11. When did you first notice symptoms of OCD?
12. Do you take any medications? If yes, please list:
13. How long have you been in therapy? How many sessions? CBT or just meds?
14. What is your current diagnosis?
a. Are you currently diagnosed with a medical condition?
b. Are you currently diagnosed with dementia?
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Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – Revised
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their everyday lives.
Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience has DISTRESSED or
BOTHERED you during the PAST WEEK. The numbers refer to the following verbal
labels:
0
Not at all
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

1
A little

2
Moderately

3
A lot

I have saved up so many things that they get in the way.
I check things more often than necessary.
I get upset if objects are not arranged properly.
I feel compelled to count while I am doing things.
I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been
touched by strangers or certain people.
I find it difficult to control my own thoughts.
I collect things I don’t need.
I repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers, etc.
I get upset if others change the way I have arranged things.
I feel I have to repeat certain numbers.
I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel
contaminated.
I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind
against my will.
I avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might need
them later.
I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after
turning them off.
I need things to be arranged in a particular order.
I feel that there are good and bad numbers.
I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary.
I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid
of them.

4
Extremely
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
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Appendix B
EMA Items

[EMA-OCD (items based on OCI-R)]
[Incidental EMA items]
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EMA-OCD (items based on OCI-R)
In the last four hours, indicate if you engaged in each of the following:

1.

I saved or collected something I don’t need.

NO
How many
times?

Yes

How long did
you spend
doing this?
2.

I checked something I didn’t need to.

NO
How many
times?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

3.

I got upset if objects were not arranged properly.

NO
How many
times?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

4.

I found myself repeatedly counting objects.

NO
How many
times did you
do this?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

5.

I found myself not wanting to touch an object touched by
someone else.

NO

Yes

How many
times did this
happen?
How long did
you spend
doing this?
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6.

I found it difficult to control my own thoughts.

NO
How many
times did this
happen?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

7.

I collected things I don’t need.

NO
How many
times did you
do this?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

8.

I repeatedly checked doors, windows, drawers, etc.

NO
How many
times did you
do this?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

9.

I got upset when someone changed the way I arranged
things.

NO

Yes

How many
times did this
happen?
How long did
you spend
doing this?
10. I repeated certain numbers.

NO
How many
times did you
do this?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

11. I washed or cleaned myself because I felt contaminated.

NO
How many
times did you
do this?
How long did

Yes
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you spend
doing this?
12. Unpleasant thoughts came into my mind against my will.

13.

I avoided throwing something away because I was afraid I
might need it later.

NO
How many
times did this
happen?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

NO

Yes

How many
times did this
happen?
How long did
you spend
doing this?
14.

I checked stove burners, water taps, and/or light switches
after turning them off.

NO

Yes

How many
times did you
do this?
How long did
you spend
doing this?
15. I arranged things in a particular order.

NO
How many
times did you
do this?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

16. I thought about good and bad numbers.

NO
How many
times did you
do this?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes
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17. I washed my hands longer than necessary.

NO
How many
times did you
do this?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes

18. I had troubling thoughts that were difficult to get rid of.

NO
How many
times did this
happen?
How long did
you spend
doing this?

Yes
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Supplemental EMA Items
Environmental variables
Where are you? [Drop down menu]
 work
 school
 home
 friend’s home
 relative’s home
 public place
 other
In the last 4 hours, what percent of time were you with someone? [Drop down menu]
 100%
 80-99%
 60-79%
 40-59%
 20-39%
 1-19%
 0% (alone the whole time)
Supplemental variables
How many hours did you sleep last night? [only at the first assessment of the day]
Rate your average mood over the last 4 hours
Positive ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Negative
Rate your average stress level over the last 4 hours
Not
--------------------------------------------------------------------Stressed

Very
Stressed

Rate your average anxiety level over the last 4 hours
Not
---------------------------------------------------------------------- Very
Anxious
Anxious
Rate your average loneliness level over the last 4 hours
Not
---------------------------------------------------------------------- Very
Lonely
Lonely
In the past 4 hours, did you have a fight/disagreement with someone?
Yes No
If yes: How upsetting was it for you?
Not at all----------------------------------------------------------------------Very
Upsetting
Upsetting
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Appendix C
Time 3 Materials/ Assessments
[Correlation Tutorial]
[Correlation Scales]
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Correlation Tutorial
OCD Assessment
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We will soon ask you to make
some ratings about your
behavior during the previous
week. Before we do this, we
need to briefly discuss a
concept called correlation.
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What is a correlation?
• A correlation is a number that describes
how two things are related to each other.
• There are several types of possible
relations. Let’s talk about a few…
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In one type of relation…
• As one thing goes up or increases, so does the
other.
• For example…
– When someone runs faster , their heartbeat speeds
up 
• So we say: “Running speed is positively correlated with
heartbeat.”

– The happier somebody feels , the more they smile 
• So we say: “Happiness is positively correlated with smiling.”

– The better someone is at math , the faster they can
balance their checkbook 

• So we say: “Math ability is positively correlated with speed of
balancing a checkbook.”

• Each of these is an example of a positive
correlation
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In another type of relation…
• As one thing goes up, the other goes down.
• For example…
– As smoking increases , life-expectancy decreases 
• So we say: “Smoking is negatively correlated with lifeexpectancy.”

– The more TV someone watches , the lower their
score on a class exam 
• So we say: “Watching TV is negatively correlated with exam
grades.”

• Each of these is an example of a negative
correlation
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In the final type of relation…
• There is actually no relation at all between two things.
• Knowing the value of one thing tells us nothing about the
value of the other
• For example…
– If shoe size goes up , we learn nothing new about how
intelligent someone may be
• So we say: “Shoe size is not correlated with intelligence”

– The color of a car tells us nothing about how fast it goes
• So we say: “Car color is not correlated with car speed.”

• Each of these is an example of no correlation between
two things
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Rating a relationship
• We can show the strength of a
relationship by rating it from -100 to
+100.
-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

Strongest possible
negative relation
between two
things
(negative correlation):
As one thing goes up 
The other goes down 

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

No relationship
between two
Things
(no correlation)

+100

Strongest possible
positive relation
between two
Things
(positive correlation):
As one thing goes up 
,
so does the other
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A correlation of “0”
• A rating of “0” would mean that there is
no relationship between two things: they
are not correlated
-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

Strongest possible
negative relation
between two
things
(negative correlation):
As one thing goes up 
The other goes down 

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

No relationship
between two
Things
(no correlation)

+100

Strongest possible
positive relation
between two
Things
(positive correlation):
As one thing goes up 
,
so does the other
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Higher number = Stronger relation
• As the number increases (either positively or
negatively), the relation is stronger and more
predictable. As the number decreases (and
gets closer to zero), the relation is weaker.
-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

Strongest possible
negative relation
between two
things
(negative correlation)
As one thing goes up 
The other goes down 

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

No relationship
between two
Things
(no correlation)

+100

Strongest possible
positive relation
between two
Things
(positive correlation):
As one thing goes up 
,
so does the other
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Notice…
• …Negative relations are on the left (red)
• …Positive relations are on the right (green)
• …No relationship is in the middle (blue)

-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90


The other goes down 

+100
,


As one thing goes up

As one thing goes up

so does the other
No relationship
between two
things
(no correlation)
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What the numbers mean
•

The bigger the number (positive or negative), the stronger
and more predictable the relationship
– So, a +90 relation is stronger, and more predictable, than +30
• It’s a stronger positive relationship

– Similarly, a -90 relation is stronger, and more predictable, than -30
• It’s a stronger negative relationship

-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

Weaker
Relationships
(closer to zero)
Stronger (more predictable)
relationships are
further from zero and
have bigger numbers

+100
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Let’s try some examples
• We might think that the relationship
between height and weight is positive
and very predictable (taller people almost
always weigh more)
• So we might estimate its relationship to be
high and positive: +80
-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

+100
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Here’s another example
• Conversely, we might think that the
relationship between TV watching and
class grades is negative and very
predictable (as someone watches more
TV, there grades go down)
• So we might estimate its relationship to be
high and negative: - 90
-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

+100
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Examples
• What if there’s no relationship?
• Remember our earlier example of a car’s
speed and its color?
• Since there is no relationship between a
car’s speed and its color (knowing a car’s
color tells us nothing about how fast it can
go), we’d circle zero.
-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

+100
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But what about weaker relationships
that are less predictable?
• When a relationship is weaker, the number
associated with it should be smaller since the
relationship is not as predictable.
• For example, people who work hard sometimes
get praised for the efforts, sometimes not. We
might think of this relationship as positive but
weak: +20
-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

+100
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A weak, negative relationship
• Similarly, some relationships are negative and
weak.
• For example, how much a person exercises may
be weakly related to how stressed the person
feels.
• As exercise goes up, stress goes down
• However, since exercise by itself may not remove
all of a person’s stress, we might rate it: -30
-100

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

+100
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Now we’ll practice
some of these
ideas.

115

What is the relation between the length of
someone’s foot and their shoe size?
Strongest
negative
relationship

-100

Mild
negative
relationship

No
relationship

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10
As length goes up

0

Mild
positive
relationship

Strongest
positive
relationship

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90



As length goes up

The size goes down 

The size goes up

Click one of the buttons below:
Between -51 and -100
Between -1 and -50
0
Between +1 and +50
Between +51 and +100

,


+100

116

Correct!
• That is correct! As the length of someone’s
foot increases, their shoe size increases.
This is a strong positive relation, so we
circle a number on the far right of this
scale.
Strongest
negative
relationship

-100

Mild
negative
relationship

No
relationship

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10
As one thing goes up 
The other goes down



0

Mild
positive
relationship

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90
As one thing goes up ,
so does the other 

Press here to move to
the next question.

+100
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Incorrect
• Please try again.

Click here to try again.
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What is the relation between how healthy
you eat and how often you go to the doctor?
Strongest
negative
relationship

-100

Mild
negative
relationship

No
relationship

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

As healthy eating goes up 
The doctor visits go down

Mild
positive
relationship

As healthy eating goes up 
,



Doctor visits go up 

Click one of the buttons below:
Between -51 and -100
Between -1 and -50
0
Between +1 and +50
Between +51 and +100

+100
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Correct!
• That is correct! Healthy eating usually is
associated with fewer doctor visits. It is a
mild negative relationship because eating
healthy is not always associated with
fewer visits to the doctor.
Mild
negative
relationship

-100

No
relationship

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10
As one thing goes up 
The other goes down



0

Mild
positive
relationship

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90
As one thing goes up ,
so does the other 

Press here to move to
the next question.

+100
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Incorrect
• Please try again.

Click here to try again.
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What is the relation between the number of
children in your family and length of a
football field?
Mild
negative
relationship

-100

No
relationship

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

Mild
positive
relationship

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

As number of kids goes up 

As number of kids goes up 
,

The length goes down 

The length goes up

Click one of the buttons below:
Between -51 and -100
Between -1 and -50
0
Between +1 and +50
Between +51 and +100



+100
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Correct!
• That is correct! There is no relation
between the number of children in your
family and the length of a football field.
Since there is no relationship, we circle the
number 0.
Mild
negative
relationship

-100

No
relationship

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10
As one thing goes up 
The other goes down



0

Mild
positive
relationship

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90
As one thing goes up ,
so does the other 

Press here to move to finish.

+100
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Incorrect
• Please try again.

Click here to try again.
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GREAT!!!
• Now that you understand this
concept, we have some questions
about different thoughts and
behaviors you experienced in the
last week…
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Time 3 Assessments
Participant estimates of symptom covariance will be assessed using the following scale:

Strongest
negative
relationship

-100

Mild
negative
relationship

No
relationship

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

Mild
positive
relationship

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

As one thing goes up 
,
The other goes down 

Strongest
positive

relationship

+100

As one thing goes up 
,
so does the other 

Example:
Please circle a number that best indicates the relationship between Stress and Obsessions
Strongest
negative
relationship

-100

Mild
negative
relationship

No
relationship

-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10

0

Mild
positive
relationship

+10 +20 +30 +40 +50 +60 +70 +80 +90

As stress goes up 
,
obsessions go down 

As stress goes up 
,
Obsessions go up 

This was repeated for obsessing and the two OCI-R subscales on which participants scored
highest (i.e., washing, hoarding, ordering, checking, or neutralizing) and the supplemental
items (sleep, being alone, stress, positive mood, negative mood, loneliness, anxiety, &
distressing fights)
1. During the last week, did you ever not tell the truth when answering the questions?
2. How normal was the week for you?
3. What percentage of the beeps did you respond to?
4. Did recording with the hand-held computer change your symptoms?
a) Not at all
b) A little
c) A lot
d) My symptoms are gone because of self-monitoring
5. How confident are you in the accuracy of your memory?

Strongest
positive

relationship

+100
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6. How confident are you in the accuracy of the information you entered in the handheld
computer?
7. How confident are you in the estimates you just provided?
8. Did you think that we were going to ask you questions about your memory?
a) If yes: When did you suspect this? Why?
9. Would you participate in a study like this again or recommend participation to a friend?
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Appendix D
Glossary
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Definitions of technical terms
Term

Definition

Autobiographical memory

Memories of one’s own past behavior

Bias

Systematic error

Episodic memory

Memories of personal events dated in the past. Can be
contrasted from semantic memory (i.e., memory of facts)
and procedural memory (i.e., actions that are relatively
automatic and not open to introspection.)

Explicit memory

Memories of events characterized by conscious recall.

Implicit memory

Memories characterized by the lack of consciousness in
the act of recalling. It is often “remembered” as part of an
action and demonstrated by improvement in a procedural
task.

Inaccurate

Random error

Overgenerality

Tendency to recall categories of events as opposed to
specific instances

Prospective Recall

The act of remembering to engage in future activities

Retrospective Recall

The act of remembering memories of past events

Recall task

Producing an item from memory without a clue

Recognition task

Identifying target items from distracter items

Schema

Abstract representations or prototypical scripts of event
types, from which accounts of particular instances are
derived when recall is solicited
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Script-like behavior

Behaviors that follow predictable, if slightly varied
patterns such as birthdays and baseball games.
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Appendix E
Human Subjects Review Committee Approval Forms

